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Abstract
Adaptive autonomous agents have to learn about the effects of their actions so as to be
able to improve their performance and adapt to long term changes. The problem of
correlating actions with changes in sensor data is 0(n2) and therefore computationally
expensive for any non-trivial application. I propose to make this problem more
manageable by using focus of attention. In particular, I discuss two complementary
methods for focus of attention: perceptual selectivity restricts the set of sensor data the
agent attends to at a particular point in time, while cognitive selectivity restricts the set of
internal structures that is updated at a particular point in time. I present results of several
implemented algorithms-variants of the schema mechanism [Drescher 91 ]-which
employ these two forms of focus of attention. The results demonstrate that incorporating
focus of attention dramatically decreases the computational expense of learning action
models without affecting the quality of the knowledge learned, with only small increases
in the number of training examples required to learn the same knowledge.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 What is an adaptive autonomous agent?
An agent is a system that tries to fulfill a set of goals while situated in a complex and
changing environment. The agent might be composed of hardware (e.g., a robot) and situ-
ated in the physical world, or composed entirely of software running in a computer. In the
latter case, the agent may be situated in a simulated world (a synthetic actor) or may inter-
act as a peer with other entities, such as network databases (a software agent, interface
agent, knowbot, etc).
Being situated in this environment, the agent can sense it in various ways, and can take
actions to change the environment or its place in it. The goals can be of many forms, such
as end goals or goals of attainment (e.g., in a robot, finding a coffee cup); goals of homeo-
stasis (e.g., not letting the robot's batteries run down); they may be rewards of some sort
that the agent attempts to maximize or punishments that it attempts to minimize; and so
forth.
The agent is autonomous if it operates in an independent fashion: in other words, when
it decides itself how to relate sensor data to actions in a way that leads to timely or reliable
satisfaction of its goals. The agent is adaptive if it can improve over time, presumably by
learning. 1
1. Other kinds of adaptation are certainly possible (for example, in biological systems, muscles adapt to
repeated high loads by gradually increasing in strength). However, we will confine our attention here to cog-
nitive adaptation-those techniques which allow the agent to understand what to do better
Unless otherwise specified, the term agent in this thesis will be taken to be an adaptive,
autonomous agent, whether physically-based or composed completely of software.
Given the specifications above, an adaptive autonomous agent thus has at least two
major problems facing it:
- Action selection, in which it must decide what action to take next, and
- Learning from experience, in which it must improve its performance over
time.
Neither of these problems is well understood; a summary of current open problems and
progress to date appears in [Maes 94]. Current solutions to either problem tend to scale
poorly, may have performance characteristics that are difficult to predict, can be difficult
to reuse in different systems, can get stuck in behavioral loops, and more.
For agents that learn, [Maes 94] specifies some desiderata that should be addressed:
- Learning should be incremental, with the agent learning after every experi-
ence, rather than being divided up into separate learning and performance
phases.
- The agent should be biased toward learning information which is relevant
to its goals.
- Learning should be able to cope with a nondeterministic world, in which
unpredictable things might happen occasionally, sensor information is
noisy, and so forth.
- The learning should be unsupervised: the agent should learn mostly auton-
omously.
- Ideally, it should be possible to build in some knowledge to the agent at the
start, so it does not have to start from scratch, especially in situations in
which prior knowledge is easily available.
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Additionally, she points out the problems that must be addressed when designing the
architecture of a learning agent:
- How does the action selection mechanism work?
- How does the agent learn? What hypotheses can it create, and how does it
decide which are worthwhile?
. What is the agent's experimental strategy? In other words, through what
mechanism does the agent decide when to exploit (performing some task as
optimally as it current knows how to do) versus when to explore (perform-
ing some action suboptimally in an attempt to discover a new, even better
strategy).
This thesis primarily explores the question of learning. Along the way, it also investi-
gates certain topics related to action selection and experimental strategy.
1.2 Some basic concepts
In studying learning in an autonomous agent, there are a few basic concepts that must
be understood. First of all, any agent operates in some particular world. The characteristics
of this world exert a strong influence on the design of the agent. For example, if the agent
is operating in a very dangerous, physical world (such as exploring a rock face near a cliff),
architectures which put great emphasis on accurate sensing and avoiding risk are quite
important. On the other hand, a software agent investigating the contents of databases may
emphasize exploratory behavior over most other considerations. The world also strongly
determines what sorts of sensors the agent may have, what sort of data it can expect to
receive from them, and so on. The design of the sensors and their interaction with the world
may determine whether the world appears essentially deterministic or highly nondetermin-
istic; this may in turn influence the design of the learning system, since not all learning sys-
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tems can tolerate noise in their inputs, and some tolerate different kinds of noise in
different ways.
The agent's goals also play an important role in its design. For example, can the agent
choose which goal to pursue next, or is it directed externally? Are its goals primarily goals
of attainment or goals of homeostasis? How many tactical (short-range) goals might it have
to execute to reach a strategic (long-range) goal? (The latter question may determine
whether the robot must engage in sophisticated reasoning or planning, for instance.)
Finally, when talking about learning in agents, one must decide whether the agent is to
display any selectivity orfocus in what it learns, or whether it should attempt to learn indis-
criminately. In evaluating how well the agent is learning, one must ask about the correct-
ness of the information learned-is the agent learning things that are actually true in the
world?-and its completeness-is the agent learning enough? In the case of an agent which
uses some form of selectivity or focus, one might also ask about relative completeness, in
which the influence of its selectivity is considered: if the agent is only supposed to be learn-
ing about certain topics, one should restrict one's evaluation of its performance to those
topics, rather than inquiring about its ability to learn everything about the world. In agents
that have goals, one might also ask about the relevance of its learning to the performance
of its goals: in other words, is what the agent learns useful in accomplishing its goals, and
does it avoid trying to learning things that are not useful for those goals?
1.3 Focus of attention in learning
Autonomous agents have to learn about their environment so as to improve (because
user programming has its limitations) and adapt (because things change). Several learning
methods for autonomous agents have been proposed, in particular reinforcement learning
[Sutton 91] [Kaelbling 93], classifier systems [Holland 86] [Wilson 85], action model
12
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learners [Drescher 91] [Maes 92] and mixed methods [Sutton 90] [Booker 88]. No matter
which of these algorithms is used, a learning agent will have to correlate some number of
sensory inputs with some number of internal structures (its internal memory of what it has
learned so far) in an attempt to extend its knowledge. This is conceptually a cross-product
problem: each sensory bit should be correlated in some fashion with each already-built
internal structures. As the number of sensory bits or the number of internal structures
grows, the work required to perform this correlation grows approximately as O(n2 ). Solu-
tions which can decrease either the constant or, preferably, the exponent, may be very help-
ful in keeping the work of learning within feasible bounds.
Most unsupervised learning algorithms attempt to learn all that there is to know about
the environment, with no selectivity save the implicit or explicit limits on the generaliza-
tions that they can entertain. 2 They flail about, often at random, attempting to learn every
possible correlation. It takes them far too long to learn a mass of mostly-irrelevant data. For
example, the schema mechanism [Drescher 91] introduces an algorithm for building suc-
cessively more reliable and abstract descriptions of the results of taking particular actions
in an unpredictable world. However, the algorithm scales poorly, and hence is unsuitable
for realistic worlds with many facts, given the current state of computational hardware. If
no provision is made to bound the number of concepts that may be learned,3 its running
speed decreases monotonically as more is learned about the world. This means that, on cur-
rently-available hardware, the algorithm eventually becomes extremely slow.
2. For any finite set of data, there are infinitely many distinct hypotheses that are consistent with those
data. However, all learning systems impose selectivity on the generalizations that they can entertain,
whether that selectivity is implicit or explicit, by virtue of their representations of the domain and the opera-
tions they perform upon those representations.
3. Say, by assuming a finite learning lifetime, or by implementing some sort of garbage-collection of con-
cepts that maintains a fixed upper bound on their number.
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In general, real creatures use variousfocus of attention mechanisms, among others per-
ceptual selectivity and cognitive selectivity, to guide their learning. By focusing their atten-
tion to the important aspects of their current experience and memory, real creatures
dramatically decrease the perceptual and cognitive load of learning about their environ-
ment and making decisions about what to do next [Aloimonos 93]. This research uses sim-
ilar methods of selectivity to build a computationally less expensive, unsupervised learning
system that might be suitable for use in an autonomous agent that must learn and function
in some complex world.
This thesis presents a range of algorithms for learning statistical action models which
incorporate perceptual and cognitive selectivity. In particular, it discusses several varia-
tions on Drescher' s schema mechanism [Drescher 91] and demonstrates that the computa-
tional complexity of the algorithm can be significantly improved without harming the
correctness and relative completeness of the action models learned. The particular forms of
perceptual and cognitive selectivity that are employed represent both domain-dependent
and domain-independent heuristics for focusing attention that potentially can be incorpo-
rated into many learning algorithms.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses different notions of focus of
attention, concentrating on heuristics for perceptual and cognitive selectivity, and lays a
basic framework for this research. It also describes the two microworlds selected in which
various algorithms were tested. Chapter 3 describes the basic methods of goal-independent
focus of attention. It also introduces some notation for talking about the methods and their
results, and discusses results in using goal-independent focus of attention. Chapter 4 then
discusses the implementation of goal-directed focus of attention, extending the results pre-
sented in Chapter 3, and describes in detail some additional methods of evaluating the
learning. Chapter 5 discusses related work in machine learning and cognitive science; both
IntroductionChapter 1
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fields have different insights into focus of attention. Chapter 6 summarizes the research,
discusses certain limitations of the approaches used, and speculates on some possible
future directions. Appendix A provides some details of the architecture used to run the
learning systems, and Appendix B details the mechanisms used, in evaluating the learning
in Chapter 4, to keep the planning process computationally efficient.
Chapter 2: The Basic Framework
2.1 Focus of Attention Methods
2.1.1 Introduction
To ease its learning task, an agent can employ a range of methods for focus of attention.
It can be selective in terms of what sensor data it attends to as well as what internal struc-
tures it considers when acting and learning. These forms of focus of attention are termed
perceptual and cognitive selectivity respectively. They are illustrated by the left and right
braces respectively in Figure 1 below, and discussed in more detail in the following sec-
tions.
sensor data schema 1(including state) schema 2
schema 3
schema n
internal structures
Figure 1: Sensory (left) and cognitive (right) pruning
Along another dimension, there is a distinction between domain-dependent and
domain- independent methods for focus of attention. Domain-independent methods repre-
sent general heuristics for focus of attention that can be employed in any domain. For
example, one can attempt only to correlate events that happened close to one another in
16
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time. Domain-dependent heuristics, on the other hand, are specific to the domain at hand.
They typically have been preprogrammed (by natural or artificial selection or by a pro-
grammer). For example, experiments have shown that when a rat becomes sick to its stom-
ach, it will assume that whatever it ate recently is causally related to the sickness. That is,
it is very hard for a rat to learn that a light flash or the sound of a bell is correlated to the
stomach problem because it will focus on recently eaten food as the cause of the problem
[Garcia 72]. This demonstrates that animals have evolved to pay attention to particular
events when learning about certain effects.
Finally, the focus mechanism can be goal-driven and/or world-driven. Focus of atten-
tion in animals is both strongly world- and goal-driven. The structure of the world and the
sensory system determines which sensory or memory bits may be "usually" ignored (e.g.
those not local in time and space), while the task determines those which are relevant some
of the time and not at other times. For example, when hungry, any form of food is a very
important stimulus to attend to; learning how to get to some would presumably take on
greater important in this case.
The results reported in Chapter 3 concern world-dependent, domain-independent cog-
nitive and sensory selectivity. Such pruning depends on invariant properties of the environ-
menti and common tasks, and does not take into account what the current goal of the agent
is. The methods can be applied to virtually any domain. While it is true that, in complex
worlds, goal-driven and domain-dependent pruning is quite important, it is surprising how
much of an advantage even goal-independent pruning can convey. Using Chapter 3's work
as a base, Chapter 4 then investigates the added leverage of adding goals to the learning
1. In a physical, terrestrial environment, such properties might include causality (actions must precede
their effects), locality (most effects are near their causes), space, time, gravity, etc.
17
system. That is, the actions taken and cognitive and perceptual pruning that occurs are con-
trolled by the short-term goals of the agent.
2.1.2 Perceptual selectivity
Perceptual selectivity limits what stimuli might possibly be attended to at any one time,
which puts limits on what might be learnable at that time. For example, a real creature
would not pay attention to every square centimeter of its skin and try to correlate every
nerve ending therein to every possible retinal cell in its eyes at every moment. Conse-
quently, it might never learn some peculiar correlation between a particular patch of skin
and a flash of light on some part of its retina, but presumably such correlations are not
important to it in its natural environment.
Obvious physical dimensions along which to be perceptually selective include spatial
and temporal selectivity. 2 The universe tends to display spatial locality: many causes are
generally located nearby to their effects (for example, pushing an object requires one to be
in contact with it). Further, many causes lead to an observable effect within a short time
(letting go of an object in a gravity field causes it to start falling immediately, rather than a
week later). Real creatures use these sorts of spatial and temporal locality all the time, often
by using eyes that only have high resolution in a small part of their visual field, and only
noticing correlations between events that take place reasonably close together in time.
While it is certainly possible to conceive of an agent that tracks every single visual event
in the sphere around it, all at the same time, and which can remember pairs of events sep-
arated by arbitrary amounts of time without knowing a priori that the events might be
related, the computational burden in doing so is essentially unbounded. 3 The algorithm dis-
2. Another dimension of selectivity concerns the amount of preprocessing done to the input. For example,
Drescher points out that, in a realistic world, correlating unprocessed retinal input is not very useful, because
it does not map well onto aspects of the world that are good building blocks for inductive generalization
[Drescher 94]. Such changes of level are not addressed in this research.
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cussed in this research implements temporal selectivity as well as spatial selectivity to
reduce the number of sensor data that the agent has to correlate with its internal structures
(see Figure 1, on page 16). Note that the perceptual selectivity implemented is of a passive
nature: the agent prunes its "bag of sensory bits," rather than changing the mapping of that
bag of bits to the physical world by performing an action that changes the sensory data
(such as changing its point of view). The latter would constitute active perceptual attention
(e.g., [Aloimonos 93] among others).
2.1.3 Cognitive selectivity
Cognitive selectivity limits what internal structures are attended to at any given
moment.
Notice that for any agent that learns many facts,4 being cognitively selective is likely
to be even more important than being perceptually selective, in the long run. The reasons
for this are straightforward. First, consider the ratio of sensory to memory items. While the
total number of possible sensory bits is limited, the number of internal structures may grow
without bound.5 This means that, were we to use a strategy which prunes all sensory infor-
mation and all cognitive information each to some constant fraction of their original,
unpruned case, we would cut the total computation required by some constant factor-but
this factor would be much larger in the cognitive case, because the number of facts stored
would likely far outnumber the number of sensory bits available.
3. Many algorithms for learning from experience employ an extreme form of temporal selectivity: the
agent can only correlate events that are "one timestep" apart.
4. In this case, since we are discussing a causal model builder, these facts are correlations of actions and
their results.
5. The assumption here is that every fact learned requires some internal structure to represent it. If the
learning algorithm in use must examine prior facts to decide whether to invalidate the fact, create a new one,
etc, then the computational effort of the algorithm will tend to increase as more facts are learned.
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Second, consider a strategy in which a constant number of sensory bits or a constant
number of remembered facts are attended to at any given time. This is analogous to the sit-
uation in which a real organism has hard performance limits along both perceptual and
cognitive axes; no matter how many facts it knows, it can only keep a fixed number of them
in working memory. In this case, as the internal structures grow, the organism can do its
sensory-to-memory correlations in essentially constant time, rather than the aforemen-
tioned 0(n2) time, though at a cost: as its knowledge grows, it is ignoring at any given time
an increasingly large percentage of all the knowledge it has.
Compromise strategies which keep growth in the work required to perform these cor-
relations within bounds (e.g., less than O(n2)), yet not give in completely to utilizing ever-
smaller fractions of current knowledge (e.g., more than 0(1)) are possible.
For example, one can use properties of the world or characteristics of the sensor data to
restrict the number of structures looked at (as is the case in the algorithms described in this
thesis). Not all internal structures are equally relevant at any given instant. In particular,
internal structures that refer neither to current nor expected future perceptual inputs are less
likely to be useful than internal structures which do. This is the particular domain-indepen-
dent, goal-independent, world-driven heuristic for cognitive selectivity which is employed
in Chapter 3. One might argue that, in real creatures, evolution optimizes them to ignore
those aspects of the environment which do not change; for example, there is little reason to
perceive nor reason about the existence of air unless one is in an environment in which it is
not ubiquitous.
Another way to compromise is to use the current goal to help select what facts are rel-
evant; such goal-driven pruning is discussed in Chapter 4. Since generally only a small
number of goals are likely to be relevant or applicable at any one time (often only one), this
can help to keep the amount of correlation work in bounds. 6 Again, in real creatures
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domain-dependent and goal-driven cognitive selectivity play a large role too. For example,
the subset of internal structures that are considered at some instant is not only determined
by what the agent senses and what it expects to sense next, but also by what it is "aiming"
to sense or not sense (i.e., the desired goals).
2.2 The testbed microworlds
In order to evaluate the effects of adding focus of attention to a system that can learn a
world model, we need something which learns (the agent) and some world model for it to
learn in (the domain or environment of the agent). The two agents chosen here were both
software agents, operating in a a microworld consisting of a simulated environment. The
combination of a particular agent and its associated environment is called a scenario.
The sections immediately following describe the two scenarios used here. Later, in
Section 3.2.1, on page 40, we describe what the learning system does with the sensory
information it receives from either environment.
In both scenarios, the world may be unpredictable; actions are allowed to have no per-
ceivable effect for any of several reasons, including incomplete sensor information (in nei-
ther scenario does the agent have an all-encompassing sensor view of the world), and
external motions or actors in the world that cannot be controlled by the agent.
In general, the learning system is connected "at arm's length" to either of the two
microworlds, and can issue only one of a small number of commands at each timestep of
the simulation. It gets back a collection of sensory bits describing what the simulated sen-
sors are perceiving, and does not have any other access to the internal state of the micro-
6. Another way to compromise might be to investigate much more of memory when other demands on the
agent's time are minimal, essentially doing as much extra work as possible when not otherwise occupied
with immediate concerns or goals which must be completed under tight deadlines.
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world. Actions are taken at random in the case of goal-independent learning, but are
informed from the goal system when performing goal-dependent learning.
Appendix A describes the overall system architecture used in this research, and shows
a schematic of how the learning system, the action selection system, and the goal system
interact. Figure 20, on page 132, describes what pieces of the system communicate with
which other pieces, and Figure 21, on page 134, shows details of when the learning system
and the microworld are allowed to exchange information. Appendix A also provides some
implementation details specific to this particular system, which might be of use in repro-
ducing it.
2.2.1 The infant/eyehand scenario
The most extensively studied scenario, both in prior work with the particular learning
system employed [Drescher 91], and in this research, concerns a simulated infant in a sim-
ple, mostly (but not completely) static microworld.
Drescher's original system is concerned with Piagetian modeling, so his microworld is
oriented towards the world as perceived by a very young infant (younger than eight months
old, e.g., before early fourth Piagetian stage). The simplified microworld, shown in
Figure 2, on page 23, consists of a simulated, two-dimensional "universe" of 49 grid
squares (7 by 7). Each square can be either empty or contain some object. Superimposed
upon this universe is a crudely simulated eye which can see a square region 5 grid squares
on a side, and which can be moved around within the limits of the simulated universe. This
eye has a fovea of a few squares in the center, which can see additional details in objects
(these extra details can be used to differentiate objects enough to determine their identi-
ties). The universe also includes a hand which occupies a grid square, and can bump into
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Figure 2: The eyehand/infant domain microworld
and grasp objects. (The infant's arm is not represented; just the hand.) An immobile body
occupies another grid square.
The infant has 10 possible actions that it can take at any given timestep, consisting of
moving the hand or eye forward, backward, left, or right (8 actions in all), and of opening
or closing the hand. It takes one of these actions at every timestep.
The possible sensory inputs consist of all bits arriving from the eye, proprioceptive
inputs from eye and hand (which indicate where, relative to the body, the eye is pointing or
the hand is reaching), tactile inputs from the hand and body, and taste inputs from the
mouth (if an object was in contact with it).7 The eye reports only whether an object (not
which object, only the presence of one) is in a grid square or not, except in its central fovea,
where it reports many additional bits.8
7. The hand gets four one-bit details when it is in contact with an object on its left side, which can be used
to differentiate objects by touch. It also gets one bit per side indicating whether an object is in contact with it
on that side. Similarly, the body gets one bit apiece to indicate contact on any of its four sides; if an object is
in contact on the front side of the body (the mouth), then four bits of taste information are also available.
Finally, there is one bit each representing whether the hand is currently closed and whether it is grasping an
object.
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The simulated infant does not have a panoramic view of all 49 squares of the universe
at once; at any given instant, it only knows about what the eye can see, what the hand is
touching, or what the mouth is tasting, combined with proprioceptive inputs for eye and
hand position. In particular, certain senses, viewed unimodally, are subject to perceptual
aliasing, in which two distinct situations in the environment appear identical to the sensory
system of the agent [Whitehead and Ballard 90]. For example, if a schema mentions only
a particular bit in the visual field, without also referring to the visual proprioceptive inputs
(which determine where the eye is pointing), then that schema may be subject to such alias-
ing-several different situations have been collapsed into the same representation, as far as
the agent is concerned. Similarly, any schema mentioning any visual-field sensory item
that is not in the fovea may alias different objects, since the non-foveal visual field reports
only the presence or absence of an object in each position, rather than the exact identity of
the object in question.
Typical knowledge that is learned about the world includes correlations between
motion of the hand and motions of the image of the hand in the visual field; motions of the
eye and motions of all objects in the visual field; correspondences between proprioceptive
and haptic or visual information; whether or not an object will be graspable depending on
whether or not it is felt to be in contact with the hand, and many more ([Drescher 91] and
[Ramstad 92] report at length the many unimodal and multimodal facts about the micro-
world learned by this system).
8. Each of the five foveal squares provides 25 bits of detail information. Each different object sets a differ-
ent combination of these 25 bits; hence, objects may be differentiated visually when they are in a foveal
square, because different combinations of bits are perceived. Note that each foveal square covers one coarse
visual square, and all motion is quantized by these coarse visual squares: this means that the details corre-
sponding to some object will never be half on one foveal square and half on another. To put this another way,
if an object is somewhere in the fovea, there are only five different positions (corresponding to the five dif-
ferent foveal squares) that any one object can be in. Objects are never rotated.
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Typical strategic goals for the infant in this microworld include centering an object in
the visual field, moving the hand into proximity to an object in order to grasp it, and so
forth. Clearly, such goals cannot be accomplished in reasonable time without having
learned about the effects of the infant's actions.9
2.2.2 The Hamsterdam scenario
The second agent and environment used in this research were based on the Hamster-
dam system [Blumberg 94]. This system's primary use is for investigating ethological
models of action-selection [Blumberg 94], and it is also used as a major component of the
"magic mirror" virtual environment created for the ALIVE project [Darrell 94] [Maes 93].
The Hamsterdam system consists of a three-dimensional world in which simulated
hamsters and predators may interact. The world also includes a floor, walls, food and water
sources, and so forth. A second instantiation of the ALIVE project included a humanoid pup-
pet, which ran under control of a simple finite-state machine, rather than the more compli-
cated, ethologically-based controllers used for the hamsters and the predators. The entire
microworld ran in real time, and was rendered as it ran using SGI Inventor on a Silicon
Graphics workstation. Figure 3, on page 26, shows a typical scene from Hamsterdam, in
which a hamster is in the lower left, and a predator is in the upper right. (The predator is
currently unable to escape its box of walls, but a human outside of the simulation has the
ability to slide the wall aside and enable the predator to reach the hamster.) Figure 4, imme-
diately below Figure 3, shows the puppet, pictured standing alone in the world.
9. The phrase "reasonable time" is important: since the world is relatively small and the action set con-
strained, it might be possible to accomplish certain strategic goals by taking random actions and eventually
reaching the goal by luck. However, as demonstrated in Section 4.4.3, on page 91, the average number of
actions employed to reach a typical strategic goal are at least an order of magnitude shorter when the agent
has learned the consequences of its actions than when the agent is not allowed to learn.
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Figure 3: Hamsterdam with a hamster and a predator
Figure 4: Hamsterdam with a puppet
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The animals in the original Hamsterdam system have a sensory system resembling that
of a robot sonar system. They shoot out 15 simulated rays in a horizontal fan at floor level,
subtending 180 degrees total, and get back sonar-like echoes which indicate, along each
ray, how close any given object is. The echo actually reveals the identity and type of any
given object, rather than simply reporting that "something" is there. A typical representa-
tion of such a sensor fan appears in Figure 5, below, as rendered by Hamsterdam, in which
Figure 5: Hamsterdam sensor fan
the white squares at various distances along the radials are the sensor echoes of (in this
case) part of a cul-de-sac where several walls meet. This sensory system, unlike that in the
infant/eyehand scenario, is not particularly multimodal. The information returned for an
object consists of the range r and angle 0 at which the object is sighted: this is essentially
purely visual. No proprioceptive information is available. The qualities reflected by taste
and texture in the infant/eyehand scenario are reflected most closely by the tags returned
by the sensor system, which indicate object identity and type.
Since the underlying learning system used in this research (e.g., the schema system
[Drescher 91], without the composite-action system) requires all sensory information to be
reduced to individual boolean predicates, rather than, e.g., numbers or ranges (see
Section 3.2.1, on page 40), the results of the sensory fan must be discretized. This is
accomplished as follows.
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First, positions in the polar coordinate system defined by r and 6 are quantized. The
original, continuous value of r is reduced to one of five ranges, compressing r values to
only five distinct quantities. These ranges are, in fact, scaled logarithmically, so that ranges
which are farther from the agent cover more distance in the unscaled, original space; this
provides more detailed range information for objects which are nearby without requiring a
large number of additional ranges.
If an object is at some particular combination of r and 6, the sensory item (a single bit)
corresponding to that combination is turned on. Since there are 15 radials and 5 ranges, this
means that there are 75 sensory items devoted to ritheta information. Note that these sen-
sory items cannot be used to differentiate one object from another, but merely to indicate
that an object occupies that particular position. In this respect, they are similar to the coarse
visual field items in the infant/eyehand scenario.
In addition to these inputs, the sensor fan is also "foveated" to yield higher-quality
information at short ranges in the center of the fan. The central three radials, for the nearest
four ranges, also return one bit apiece to indicate whether an object at that position is one
of: a hamster, a predator, a wall, food, or water. The cross product of these 3 by 4 by 5 pos-
sibilities yields another 60 sensory items.
The discretized sensory system is illustrated in the schematic below. The foveation is
Figure 6: Discretization and foveation of the Hamsterdam sensor fan
shown by the gray region. Note that the logarithmic scaling of r is actually more pro-
nounced than shown in this diagram
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This sensory system has all of the possible problems with sensory aliasing described in
Section 2.2.1, on page 22, in the description of the infant/eyehand scenario, and more. In
particular, the infant/eyehand scenario at least has proprioceptive inputs from its eye, so it
could (in theory) be able to build a complete world picture by taking into account the cur-
rent portion of the world encompassed by its eye (as revealed by proprioceptive inputs),
combined with current inputs from the eye itself. In the Hamsterdam scenario, even that
level of information is unavailable, since the actors in the world are free to roam about it,
and information about their current position or orientation is not available from the sensory
system (and would have to be inferred either from available sensory information, dead
reckoning from a known landmark, or something similar). If the infant/eyehand scenario
did not make proprioceptive sensory items available from the hand and eye, it would
resemble this aspect of the Hamsterdam scenario.
In the ALIVE system [Maes 93], the puppet never "shared the stage" with the hamsters
and the predators; instead, users of the systems could switch between these two worlds. As
modified for this research, the puppet and the animals are both allowed to share the same
world.
Further, the puppet in ALIVE did not have an ethologically-based action controller;
instead, inputs from the visual tracking system which tracked human participants drove a
simple finite-state machine which in turn commanded various movements of the puppet.
As modified here, the puppet's actions are controlled by the learning system, and it has had
the hamster sensory system "grafted on" to serve as input sensory items to the learning sys-
tem.
The learning system may only control the puppet, and not any of the other animals or,
e.g., the position of the walls. The allowable motions of the puppet include walking for-
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ward a step, turning in either direction, 10 standing up from a sitting position, and sitting
down again.
As in the infant/eyehand scenario, learning the consequences of actions includes learn-
ing the correlation between actions such as rotating or walking and the observed movement
of objects in the sensor fan. Goals include rotating until an object is centered along a foveal
ray, walking until an object is at minimum range, and so forth.
Because the Hamsterdam scenario is significantly more active than the infant/eyehand
scenario (e.g., hamsters or predators may be rolling around all the time, causing many
changes to the environment regardless of what the agent is doing), the learning system has
an explicit representation of a null action in this scenario, used to help model the result of
not doing anything. See Appendix A for further details about null actions.
10. The puppet turns by an amount which matches the angular offset of a pair of rays in the sensor fan, e.g.,
about 12.857 degrees. This was chosen to conveniently match the action to the sensory system, in the way
that moving the eye or hand in the eyehand/infant scenario causes all the other sensory inputs (e.g., proprio-
ceptive, visual) to slide one position in some direction.
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This research started with an existing learning algorithm [Drescher 91], and added a
focus of attention mechanism, as described below, to make learning faster (requiring less
computation per timestep). While Drescher's original work does include a concept similar
to both tactical and strategic goals, his system does not exploit goals to guide the learning
process. Further, it has no perceptual selectivity and assumes that every sensory bit might
be useful all the time.1 This approach leads to a theoretically "pure" result for the issues
which Drescher was investigating, but one which is difficult to use in a real application,
and which seems somewhat implausible in describing how real organisms learn.
The following discussion is an overview of the operation of the schema system; for a
much more complete and detailed explanation of its intricacies, see [Drescher 91] and
[Ramstad 92].
3.1 Model of the learning system
This section presents a very brief overview of the schema system [Drescher 91] to aid
in understanding the focused and unfocused learning algorithms presented later. The
schema system is designed to be used in building causal models of the results of actions.
1. With one very small exception, as follows. The last action taken is itself represented in the bits given to
the learning algorithm (since any new schema created to represent the results of the action just taken will be
a schema mentioning that action, and no other). Since only the last action taken is so represented to the
learning algorithm, only the last action taken is attended to when attempting to correlate actions with their
results. All other sensory inputs (e.g., proprioceptive, visual, etc) are attended to whether or not they have
changed recently.
Hence, it is designed to be hooked up to some agent which is situated in an environment,
and which has some sensory inputs and motor outputs.
3.1.1 The sensory system: Items
Every sensory item is represented in the simulation as a single bit. In Drescher's origi-
nal algorithm, there is no grouping of these bits in any particular way (e.g., as a retinotopic
map, or into particular modalities); the learning algorithm sees only an undifferentiated
"bag of bits."
This means that values in the world which are not simple binary bits must somehow be
turned into individual bits. Ranges, for example, are most usefully represented as a set of
bits, any one of which would be asserted when the value is within some particular interval
of the range. 2
3.1.2 The motor system: Actions
The schema system assumes a known, fixed number of possible actions that the agent
may take. It takes one of these actions at every timestep of the simulation, and observes
which sensory items have changed after the action.
In Drescher's original implementation, the system spent most of its time (a fixed 90%)
taking random actions and observing the results. The remaining 10% of its time was spent
taking actions which had led to some reliable outcome before, to see if actions could be
chained. 3 The work reflected in this chapter instead represents a totally random action
selection strategy: the agent always picks its next action at random. In Chapter 4, in the
2. There is no particular reason why such range values could not be represented instead as, e.g., a binary
number. However, such a representation, though more compact in terms of the number of sensory bits,
would be somewhat slower to learn, since a schema (see Section 3.1.3) which made accurate predictions
about the value might have to have a conjunctive context or result (see Section 3.1.3.2.6) which completely
specified all n bits of the number. Generating such conjunctions would be quite timeconsuming.
3. See the composite action mechanism of [Drescher 91].
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context of goal-directed focus of attention, we also investigate less random and more goal-
oriented action selection strategies.
3.1.3 The knowledge base: Schemas
3.1.3.1 What is a schema?
The "facts" learned by this system are called schemas. They consist of a triple of the
context (the initial state of the world, as perceived by the sensory system), the action taken
on this iteration, and the result (the subsequent perceived state), which maps actions taken
in a particular configuration of sensory inputs into the new sensory inputs resulting from
that action. In the infant/eyehand scenario, a typical schema might therefore be, "If my
eye's proprioceptive feedback indicates that it is in position (2,3) [context], and I move my
eye one unit to the right [action], then my eye's proprioceptive feedback indicates that it is
in position (3,3) [result]." A simple textual way of representing this would be
vP23/EYER/VP33, as described in [Drescher 91] and [Ramstad 92].
Another typical schema might be, "If my hand's proprioceptive feedback indicates that
it is in position (3,4) [context], and I move it one unit back [action], I will feel a taste at my
mouth and on my hand [result]," or HP34/HANDB/TASTE&TACT. 4 Notice that this latter
schema is multimodal in that it relates a proprioceptive to taste and tactile senses; the learn-
ing mechanism and its microworld build many multimodal schemas, relating touch to
vision, vision to proprioception, taste to touch, graspability to the presence of an object
near the hand, and so forth. It also creates unimodal schemas of the form illustrated in the
first schema above, which in this case relates proprioception to proprioception.
Since behavior of the world may be nondeterministic (e.g., actions may sometimes fail,
or sensory inputs may change in manners uncorrelated with the actions being taken), each
4. This is because the hand will move from immediately in front of the mouth to in contact with the mouth.
We assume that the infant's mouth is always open, which seems empirically reasonable for most infants.
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schema also records statistical information which is used to determine whether the schema
accurately reflects a regularity in the operation of the world, or whether an initial "guess"
at the behavior of the world later turned out to be a coincidence. (For details about how this
actually works, see the next section.) This information is recorded in a schema's extended
context and an extended result, which keep these statistics for every item not yet present in
the context or result.
3.1.3.2 How are schemas created? The marginal attribution mechanism
A schema is deemed to be reliable if its predictions of (context, action, result) are
accurate more than a certain percentage of the time. If we already have a reliable schema,
and adding some additional sensory item to the items already expressed in either its context
or its result makes a schema which appears that it, too, might be reliable, we spin off a new
schema expressing this new conjunction. 5 Spinoff schemas satisfy several other con-
straints, such as not ever duplicating an existing schema, and may themselves serve to be
the basis for additional spinoffs later.
The description below, until the end of this section (Section 3.1.3.2), is quoted with a
few modifications from [Ramstad 92]; that description, in turn, was a summarization of
[Drescher 91]. See the latter in particular for more depth on the subtleties of the schema
system and marginal attribution in particular; this description, being a summary, glosses
over particular refinements which prevent certain combinatorial explosions.
5. For example, consider the schema VF33/EYER/FoVF22, which states that, if a particular coarse visual
field bit (the one at 3,3) is on, and the agent moves the eye right, it will see a particular fine foveal visual bit
turn on (the one at 2,2). If this schema is sufficiently reliable, and it also seems from experience that VF32 is
usually off just before we take this action in this case, the schema system might spin off the schema
-,VF32&VF33/EYER/FOVF22 from the original schema. (Note that the notation often used in, e.g.,
[Ramstad 92] would say -VF32 instead of -,VF32; we use both forms interchangeably here.) While the origi-
nal schema must be deemed reliable to be considered for a spinoff (to prevent combinatorial explosion), the
new one is not yet known to be reliable, and will itself be considered a spinoff candidate only if it, too, is
later shown to be reliable.
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3.1.3.2.1 Bare schemas
Schemas are bootstrapped from an initial set of bare schemas, which have neither con-
text nor result and hence do not predict anything. There is one bare schema for each action
that can be taken.
As the simulation is run, a technique known as marginal attribution is used to discover
statistically important context and result information. This information is then used to fine-
tune existing schemas by creating modified versions of them. Marginal attribution suc-
ceeds in greatly reducing the combinatorial problem of discovering reliable schemas from
an extremely large search space without prior knowledge of the problem domain.
3.1.3.2.2 Result spinoffs
Many different results may occur from the execution of a given action. For every bare
schema, the schema mechanism tries to find result transitions which occur more often with
a particular action than without it. For example, a hand ends up closed and grasping an
object much more often when the grasp action is taken than with any other action. Results
discovered in this fashion are eligible to be included in a result spinoff-a new schema
identical to its parent, but with the relevant result item included. The marginal attribution
process can only create result spinoffs from bare schemas.
Specifically, each bare schema has an extended result-a structure for holding result
correlation information. The extended result for each schema keeps correlation informa-
tion for each item (primitive or synthetic). The positive-transition correlation is the ratio of
the number of occurrences of the item turning on when the schema's action has been taken
to the number of occurrences of the item turning on when the schema's action has not been
taken. Similarly, the negative-transition correlation is the ratio of the number of occur-
rences of the item turning off when the schema's action has been taken to the number of
occurrences of the item turning off when the schema's action has not been taken. Note that
an item is considered to have turned on precisely when the item was off prior to the action
and on after the action was performed, and similarly for turning off. The correlation statis-
tics are continuously updated by the schema mechanism and weighted towards more recent
data. When one of these schemas has a sufficiently high correlation with a particular item,
the schema mechanism creates an appropriate result spinoff-a schema with the item pos-
itively included in the result if the positive-transition correlation is high, or a schema with
the item negatively included in the result if the negative-transition correlation is high.
These simple statistics are very good at discovering arbitrarily rare results of actions, espe-
cially when the statistics of the non-activated schemas are only updated for unexplained
transitions. A transition is considered explained if the item in question was included in the
result for an activated schema with high reliability (above an arbitrary threshold) and it did,
in fact, end up in the predicted state.
3.1.3.2.3 Context spinoffs
For schemas which have non-negligible results, the marginal attribution mechanism
attempts to discover conditions under which the schema obtains its result more reliably. To
extend the example cited above, a hand ends up closed and grasping something much more
often an object can be felt touching the correct part of the hand before the grasp action is
executed. This information is used to create context spinoffs-duplicates of the parent
schema, but with a new item added to its context.
Schemas with non-empty results have an extended context. For each item, this structure
keeps a ratio of the number of occurrences of the schema succeeding (i.e., its result obtain-
ing) when activated with the item on the number of occurrences of the schema succeeding
when activated with the item off. If the state of a particular item before activation of a given
schema does not affect its probability of success, this ratio will stay close to unity. How-
ever, if having the item on increases the probability of success, the ratio will increase over
Chapter 3 Goal-independent Learning
Chapter 3 Goal-independent Learning
time. Similarly, if having the item off increases the probability of success, the ratio will
decrease. If one of these schemas has a significantly high or low ratio for a particular item,
the schema mechanism creates the appropriate context spinoff-a schema with the item
positively included in the context if the ratio is high, or one with the item negatively
included if the ratio is low.
There is an embellishment to the process of identifying context spinoffs. When a con-
text spinoff occurs, the parent schema resets all correlation data in its extended context, and
keeps an indication of which item (positively or negatively included) was added to its
spinoff child. In the future, when updating the extended context data for the parent schema,
if that item is on (if positively included in the spinoff) or off (if negatively included in the
spinoff), the trial is ignored and the extended context data is not modified. This embellish-
ment means that the parent schema has correlation data only for those trials where there is
no more specific child schema, and it encourages the development of spinoff schemas from
more specific schemas rather than general schemas.
Redundancy is also reduced by a further embellishment. If, at a particular moment in
time, a schema has multiple candidates for a context spinoff, the item which is on least fre-
quently is the one chosen for a context spinoff. The system keeps a generality statistic for
each item which is merely its rate of being on rather than off-it is this statistic which is
used when deciding between multiple spinoff possibilities. This embellishment discour-
ages the development of unnecessary conjunctions when a single specific item suffices.
3.1.3.2.4 Conjunctive contexts and results
The context can be iteratively modified through a series of context spinoffs to include
more and more conjuncts in the context. For a variety of reasons, but primarily to avoid
combinatorial explosion, a similar process for result conjunctions is undesirable. The mar-
ginal attribution process therefore requires that result spinoffs occur only from bare sche-
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mas, and only one relevant detail can be detected and used as the result for the spinoff
schema. However, conjunctive results are necessary if the schemas should be able to chain
to a schema with a conjunctive context. (See Chapter 4 for much more about chaining
schemas.) This problem is solved by adding a slot to the extended result of each bare
schema for each of the conjunctions of items which appear as the context of a highly reli-
able schema. Statistics are kept for these in the same fashion as those kept for single items,
and if one of these conjunctions is often turned on as the result of taking a given action, a
result spinoff occurs which includes the entire conjunction in the result. Effectively, this
process is able to produce schemas with conjunctive results precisely when such schemas
are necessary for chaining.
3.1.3.2.5 Summary of marginal attribution
Schemas created by the marginal attribution process are designed to either encapsulate
some newly discovered piece of knowledge about causality in the microworld (result
spinoff), or to improve upon the reliability of a previous schema (context spinoff). By con-
tinuously creating new versions of previous schemas, the system iteratively improves both
the reliability and the scope of its knowledge base. It is interesting to note that, once cre-
ated, a schema is never removed from the system. Rather, it may be supplanted by one or
more spinoff schemas which are more useful due to higher reliability and greater specific-
ity.
3.1.3.2.6 Synthetic items
The schema system also defines many other concepts; we mention here briefly one
other, namely synthetic items, that will become more important in Section 4.4.2, on
page 87. This section can safely be skipped, at least until then, without loss of continuity.
There are certain concepts that primitive items are unable to express, for example, that
a particular object is present at a particular location while the glance orientation is such that
the object is out of view. The schema mechanism contains a facility for building synthetic
items-items which, when on, indicate that a particular unreliable schema, if activated,
would succeed. Suppose a schema saying /[MOVE GLANCE ORIENTATION TO VPOl]/vOvFO2
(note that this schema has no context) is very reliable if some object in the microworld is
in the correct position. However, this object spontaneously moves around between a few
different positions and so, on average, is only in the correct position some of the time.
Notably, this schema, if activated and successful, will continue to be very reliable for some
period of time (equal to the duration that the object remains in that position), even though
on average it is normally not very reliable. To discover such situations, the schema mech-
anism keeps a local consistency statistic which indicates how often the schema succeeds
when its last activation was successful. If a schema is unreliable but highly locally consis-
tent, the mechanism constructs a synthetic item-an item which, when on, indicates that
the schema (its host schema), if activated, would succeed. Effectively, such an item, when
on, predicts what the result of activating the host schema would be. For a variety of reasons
(see [Drescher 91]), synthetic items are fundamentally very different from primitive items
and express concepts which are inexpressible through any conventional combination of
primitive items.
Primitive items get their state directly from the microworld. On the other hand, the
schema mechanism itself must maintain and update the state of all synthetic items. (The
rules for how this update is accomplished are complicated and not explained here.) The use
of synthetic items effectively allows the schema mechanism to invent new concepts-con-
cepts which are not expressed well by the microworld or cannot be expressed by conjunc-
tions of boolean values at all.
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3.2 Improving learning via focus
If we are to talk about improving the computational effort of learning, we must first be
clear about what happens during learning, and how to describe how much work is per-
formed for various modifications of the basic learning algorithm.
3.2.1 The work of learning
Given the action model learning algorithm described above, at each clock tick, we must
do two things:
. First, we must update various statistics reflecting what just happened; this is
the "perception" part of the learning algorithm. A focus mechanism dictates
which sensory items will be attended to6 (Stati), for which schema num-
bers (Stats).
- Second, we must decide whether to spin off a new schema; this is the
"learning" part of the algorithm, and here the focus mechanism dictates
which item numbers to check for reliability (Spini) for which schema num-
bers (Spins).
Thus, our choice of these four sets of numbers determines which sensory items and
schemas are used in either updating our perception of the world, or deciding when a corre-
lation has been learned. Stat, and Stats determine the perceptual selectivity, while Sping and
Spins determine the cognitive selectivity of the agent, as shown in the table below)
Statistics Spinoffs
Which items? Stati Spin
Which schemas? Stats Spins
6. In other words, will have their associated statistics reflecting frequency of occurrence updated in all
schemas which mention them.
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The algorithm does the vast majority of its work in two 0(n2) loops (one loop for
updating statistics, reflecting what is currently perceived, and one loop for deciding
whether to spin off new schemas, reflecting learning from that perception). The number of
items and the number of schemas selected at any given clock tick determines the amount
of work done by the learning algorithm in that tick. Thus, if Workstat is the work done
during the statistical-update part of the algorithm (e.g., perceiving the world) of any one
clock tick, and Workspin is similarly the amount of work done in deciding which spinoff
schemas to create, then the work done during either one is the product of the number of
items attended to and the number of schemas attended to, or:7
Workstat = Stati|| e ||Stat,||
Workspin = Spini|| o ||Spin,1
This means that the total work per step (clock tick) is simply the sum of these individ-
ual pieces, and that the total work over some particular number of steps is simply the sum
of the work during the individual steps: 8
Workstep = WorkStat + Workspin
WorkTotal = X Workstep
steps
Thus, the behavior of Workstep over time tells us how well the algorithm will do at
keeping up with the real work, e.g., how much it slows down as the number of iterations
(which is proportional, though not in a particularly simple way, to the number of schemas)
increases.
7. Where lixJl denotes the cardinality of the set x.
8. There is no particular end to this series of learning steps. In this research, the number of steps taken was
limited by the amount of time available to learn, or by the approximate number of schemas that were desired
for a run, and so forth. In a real agent, we might turn off the learning system once the agent has shown that it
is competent (see Chapter 4) to perform some set of tasks-or not. After all, if we were ever to turn off the
learning system, the agent would fail to change its internal world model even if the external world were to
change.
Chapter 3 Goal-independent Learning
The discussion above looked at the work per step, e.g., per clock tick of the simulation.
Another way of evaluating the utility of the various algorithms is to examine the amount of
work performed per schema learned (either reliable schemas or all schemas; the former
being perhaps the more useful metric):
Wo rkse
Work StepSchemaRel = stepSchemaRelstep
which is simply the amount of work performed during some steps (Workstep) divided
by the number of reliable schemas generated by that work (SchemaRelstep).9 A similar def-
inition for total schemas over total work is straightforward: 10
Work
Work StpSchemaTotal = StepStep SchemaTotalstep
An algorithm which determines these choices is thus described by the pairs
<<Stat ,,Stat, >,<Spin,,Spin,>>; we will call each element a selector.
A little more terminology will enable us to discuss the actual selectors used.
Schemamax is the number of schemas currently learned. Itemmax is the number of sen-
sory items. Itemn is the value of sensory bit n, and Item , t is the value of that item at some
time t. SchemaDepOni denotes some schema s which is dependent upon (e.g., refer-
ences in its context or result) some item i.
9. Note a peculiar detail here. It is possible for a schema that was formerly thought to be reliable to be later
decided to be unreliable. This could happen if the world has changed in the meantime, or if some not-very-
correct correlation happened often enough to push the schema over the arbitrary threshold from not being
considered reliable to being considered reliable, and then later data pushed the schema's reliability back
down. Hence, it is possible for the number of reliable schemas to decrease during a single step, and this is
not an altogether infrequent occurrence. This means that, while the average of WorkstepSchemaRel is posi-
tive, the instantaneous value might be negative if Step is a single step or a small number of steps.
10. Since the total number of schemas (as opposed to reliable schemas) can never decrease, this number
must always be nonnegative.
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3.2.2 The basic learning algorithm
In Drescher's basic algorithm, every possible sensory bit before an action taken by the
"infant" was correlated with every possible sensory bit after the action, for every schema
that has been created so far. In other words, Stat; and Sping use the selector all item num-
bers, or AIN:
Stati = Spin = AIN, where
AIN = {nIO 5n !Itemmax}
and Stats and Spins use the selector all schema numbers, or ASN:
Spin = Spin = ASN, where
ASN = {nI0! n ! Schemamax}
This means that the basic algorithm does a tremendous amount of work in the two n x m
inner loops, where n is the size of the set of items in use, ||AIN|I , and similarly m is the size
of the set of schemas in use, ||ASNI . Hence,
WorkStat = Workspin = ||AIN|| * ||ASN||
This algorithm can eventually learn a large number of facts about the world in this way,
but it runs slowly, and becomes increasingly slow as the number of known facts (e.g., sche-
mas) increases. Furthermore, if we were to increase the number of sensory bits available
(e.g., by putting a higher-resolution camera in an agent using this technique), the work
involved would increase in direct proportion to the number of added sensory bits, even if
none of these bits ever changed.
3.2.3 The focused algorithm
Various pruning techniques help a great deal over the basic approach. The most suc-
cessful of the approaches examined, which we shall call the focused algorithm, takes the
following tack (why these particular parameters were chosen is explained at the end of this
section):
- Perceptual selectivity. When updating statistics, only consider sensory
items which have changed very recently (last two clock ticks) and only in
schemas which make predictions about those items.
- Cognitive selectivity. When deciding whether to spin off a schema (make a
new fact), only consider sensory items which have changed in the last clock
tick, and only consider schemas which have had their statistics changed in
the last clock tick (such schemas can only have had their statistics changed
if they themselves made predictions involving sensory items which them-
selves have changed).
Put more precisely, the items used were as follows. Stat; used the all changed items in
history, or CINIH selector (where the word "history" refers to a timeline of prior events,
of some chosen length or horizon, and in this case of length 2):
Stati = CINIHH , where
CINIHH = AIN n {3 (0 < T ! H) IItemt # Item, t - TI
while Sping used a specialization of this, in which the history is only the very last event,
which we shall call the changed item numbers, or CIN, selector for compactness:
Spini = CIN, where
CIN =AIN r {Itemt # Itemn, t -} = CINIH I
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Similarly, the schemas used were as follows. Consider the set all bare schemas, or
ABS:II
ABS = ASN n {V (0 ! i Itemmax) -,SchemaDepnOn}
To define Stats, we add to these schemas dependent upon changed items, to get:
Stat = ABSPSDUCIH, where
ABSPSDUCI = ABS u {SchemaDepOni CIN}
This selector is a special case of the more general one (which uses an arbitrary-length
history), in that it uses a history of length 1. The general case, of course, is:
ABSPSDUCIIH = ABS u {SchemaDepnOni e CINIHH}
Finally, Spins is defined as schemas with recently updated statistics, or
Spin = SWRUS, where
SWRUS = ASN r) {SchemaDep,0n (i e CIN) }
Adding these changes amounts to adding some simple lookup tables to the basic algo-
rithm that track which items were updated in the last clock tick, and, for each item, which
schemas refer to it in their contexts or results. These tables are then used to determine
which sensory items or schemas will be participants in the statistical update or spinoffs.
Keeping the tables updated requires a negligible overhead on the basic algorithm. 12
3.2.3.1 How has focus changed the computational effort?
The computational effort in the two n x m major loops is reduced by these selectors as
follows:
11. Recall, from Section 3.1.3.2, on page 34, that bare schemas make no predictions about anything, and
that there is one of these per action at the start of any run.
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WorkStat = ||CINIH 21 ||ABSPSDUCIII
Workspin = ||CIN|| e ||SWRUS||
In any run which generates more than a trivial number of schemas or has more than a
handful of sensory bits, this is a dramatic reduction in the complexity, as shown in
Figure 8, on page 55. Another way to look at it is as follows:
- The unfocused algorithm allows the work of learning to grow as the full
cross-product of the total number of sensory bits (items) and the total num-
ber of predictions we make about the world (schemas).
- In the focused algorithm, the work of learning instead grows as the product
of the amount of change in the world times the number of predictions we
make about those items which changed.
If the world were such that every item changed at every step, and we had (somehow)
managed to make a prediction about every item in every schema, then these two algorithms
would behave identically. However, this does not describe very many plausible worlds in
which we might want an agent to do learning, nor is it plausible that every prediction the
agent may want to make about the world needs to mention every possible sensory bit the
agent can perceive.
12. Sensory: Updating the list of items which have changed recently (where recently is defined by the hori-
zon in use) runs in time linear with the number of items.
Cognitive: Each time we spin off a schema, we must update the table that maps items to schemas which
depend upon them, in order to properly reflect the dependence of the schema on the items. This update runs
in time linear with the number of items mentioned by the schema, and this number is very small anyway
(less than half a dozen or so in the runs described).
Result 1: The work per spinoff is linear, which means it is negligible compared to the rest of the algo-
rithm, which runs overall in approximately O(n2 ) time.
Result 2: We must perform the cognitive step above for each spinoff. Spinoffs become somewhat more
frequent per clock tick as the number of clock ticks increases (e.g., if there are more schemas in the knowl-
edge base, the number of new, spinoff schemas we are likely to create is higher). Thus, there is a slow
growth in the overall work per clock tick to keep these tables updated, which grows per clock tick as the
number of spinoffs per clock tick grows.
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The problem of learning here is still 0(n2), of course. We are still correlating some sen-
sory bits with some predictions. However, the magnitude of this correlation has been
decreased by an amount reflecting the behavior of the world and the characteristics of our
predictions about that world.
3.2.3.2 Why were these parameters chosen?
The perceptual and cognitive strategies above place a high value on novel stimuli.
Causes which precede their effects by more than a couple of clock ticks are not attended to.
In the world described above, this is perfectly reasonable behavior. If the world had behav-
iors in it where more prior history was important, it would be necessary to attend further
back in time to make schemas which accurately predicted the effects of actions.
The actual temporal horizons13 used were determined empirically. For example, sev-
eral runs using horizons for parameters of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, and 100 were tried, for both
horizons (in other words, the cross-product of most of the combinations), and it was
observed that the increase in learning was negligible (though not zero) above the values
chosen. In the particular case of the sensory update horizon, values smaller than two tended
to cause the statistical machinery to malfunction, missing most transitions (e.g., it became
difficult to perceive that some particular bit did not change after some particular action).
Those readers familiar with the full schema mechanism described in [Drescher 91] may
wonder about the interactions of synthetic items and this temporal horizon, particularly
synthetic items employing composite actions. The runs investigated did not tend to gener-
ate large numbers of synthetic items (although see Section 4.4.2, on page 87, for some
other remarks on this subject). If synthetic items with composite actions (which are used,
for example, to represent object persistence [Drescher 91] and whose values might change
13. As specified in Section 3.2.3, the horizons were two clock ticks when doing perceptual update, and one
clock tick when finding candidates for spinoffs.
due to events arbitrarily far in the past) were much more common, the temporal horizons
used would most likely require some adjustment upwards. However, as Drescher points out
[Drescher 94], it might suffice to represent intermediate states that keep track of the effects
of the past events, so that only the temporally local values of those intermediate states need
be attended to. However, this has not been investigated here.
Note that the above problem with synthetic items and the temporal horizons would only
be true, however, if such synthetic items had actions which were composite-and this
implementation, which lacks composite actions, cannot ever generate such synthetic items.
Since all synthetic items generated in this implementation are therefore noncomposite,
looking arbitrarily far back in history is not necessary.
These particular strategies also place a high value on a very specific spatial locality.
Even sensory items that are very near items which have changed are not attended to. Since
this microworld only has objects which are one bit wide, and the actions which involve
them are, e.g., touch (which requires contact), this strategy works well. 14 In a world where
actions had effects farther away than a single pixel in the visual field, or which contained
objects subtending more pixels in the visual field, for example, such a strategy would have
to be modified.
14. Selectors which attended to the unchanged items in a spatial "halo" around changed items were found to
be less efficient, in terms of work per reliable schema, than the selectors described here. A different micro-
world (such as one with spatially larger objects, or different types of actions available to the agent) might
require selectors that attended to a wider radius of (unchanged) sensory items around items which actually
changed, in which case such "haloing" would be necessary to reliably learn the effects of actions.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Evaluation of the focused algorithm
Two crucial questions that must be addressed concern how much the system learns
(completeness), and whether what it learns actually reflects its experience (correctness).
We must evaluate whether these focus of attention mechanisms impair that learning in any
way. After all, one way to decrease the work of learning would be to simply ignore the
world completely-but the resultant gain in speed could hardly be said to be worthwhile,
because nothing would be learned.
The discussion below is based on results from the infant/eyehand scenario. Results
from the Hamsterdam scenario have been comparable. However, since the majority of the
goal-independent mechanism was developed using the infant/eyehand scenario, the Ham-
sterdam results were primarily restricted to simple verification of similar savings for simi-
lar mechanisms, and a relatively smaller number of experiments were performed. (The
infant/eyehand scenario had literally dozens of experimental runs performed while the
algorithms were being developed, from which, e.g., the chart shown in Figure 8, on
page 55, is only a small sample. The Hamsterdam scenario tried out the resultant algo-
rithms for verification and demonstrated that they worked acceptably there, too, but was
not as exhaustively sampled as was the infant/eyehand scenario.)
3.3.1.1 Completeness
The schema system generates thousands of schemas in runs of reasonable duration, for
instance, runs of ten or twenty thousand iterations have generated over 7000 schemas. How
is one to know what all of these facts really represent? The state of the knowledge base is
critically dependent upon prior knowledge: a more-detailed schema can only be generated
from a less-detailed one, so any change in the learning mechanism which changes which
49
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schemas are generated leads to rapidly-diverging sets of generated schemas. While all may
say approximately the same thing, the fine details of exactly which facts are learned will
tend to be different. It would be possible to run enough iterations so that almost every pos-
sible fact that is true about the microworld could be learned to be true, but this is an unrea-
sonably large amount of computation (the total number of learned schemas plotted over
time appears to have an asymptote at least in the tens of thousands of schemas, even for this
simple world).
3.3.1.1.1 Manual evaluation methods
Manual inspection of the schemas generated by these runs was employed as a first cut
at establishing that alternative focus mechanisms were not substantially decreasing com-
pleteness, and tools were developed for examining how many schemas, representing what
general categories of facts (e.g., unimodal visual field, multimodal across various modali-
ties, etc) were being learned. By comparing rough totals of different types of generated
schemas, one could obtain at least some assurance that some particular class of schemas
was not being systematically omitted.
Another manual method of checking the results employed n-way comparisons of the
generated schemas themselves. The (context, action, result) triple of each schema can be
represented relatively compactly in text (ignoring all the statistical machinery that also
makes up a schema); by sorting the schemas generated in any particular run into a canoni-
cal order, and then comparing several runs side-by-side, one can gain an approximate idea
of how different runs fared. Figure 7, on page 52, demonstrates a tiny chunk from a 5-way
comparison of a certain set of runs, in which 5 somewhat-different runs were compared for
any large, overall changes to the types of schemas generated. 15
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3.3.1.1.2 Automatic evaluation methods
Manual methods are tedious and error-prone. Furthermore, the underlying reason that
an agent learns is to aid it in the pursuit of its goal. This means that a sensible evaluation
strategy is to ask if the agent has, indeed, learned enough to accomplish goals that it was
unable to accomplish before learning.
A simple way to establish what the agent knows is therefore to use the generated sche-
mas as parts of a plan, chaining them together such that the result of one schema serves as
the context of the next, and to build these chains of schemas until at least one chain reaches
from the initial state of the microworld to the goal state. If we can build at least one such
chain, we can claim that the agent knows how to accomplish the goal in that context; the
shortness of the chain can be used as a metric as to how well the agent knows. 16 For this
task, the schemas to be used should be those deemed reliable, e.g., those which have been
true sufficiently often in the past that their predictions have a good chance of being correct.
Simply employing all schemas, reliable or not, will lead to many grossly incorrect chains.
(A more complete description of the chaining system, and its use in evaluating the results
of learning, is deferred until Chapter 4, where the generated chains are also used in goal-
directed learning and behavior.)
At the start, no facts about the world are known, hence no chain of any length can be
built. However, after a few thousand schemas are built (generally between 1000 and 5000),
15. The layout of this chart, and its ordering, is not accidental. This is, after all, a manual evaluation
method; it depends on the ability of the human visual system to pick out aberrations in patterns. Large holes
or gaps in the columns merit closer attention, allowing the effort of checking carefully to be limited to only a
small number of cases.
16. Note that the small size of the microworld and the small number of actions possible at any given
timestep mean that even a random walk through state space has a significant chance of accomplishing the
goal, if we are willing to wait long enough; hence, a path which is close to optimal, rather than one which
exists at all, should be our metric for whether learning has succeeded. See Section 4.4.3, on page 91, for a
comparison of the length of the chains built for a typical goal versus the average length of a random-walk to
the goal.
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most starting states can plausibly chain to a simple goal state, such as centering the visual
field over the hand, in a close-to-optimal number of steps.
3.3.1.1.3 Completeness results
Given this mechanism, how well did the focus of attention mechanisms fare? Quite
well. In general, given the same approximate number of generated schemas, both the basic
and focused approaches cited above learned "the same" information: they could both have
plausibly short chains generated that led from initial states to goals. Both the chaining
mechanism described above, and manual inspection, showed no egregious gaps in the
knowledge or particular classes or types of facts that failed to be learned.
As shown in Figure 8, on page 55, and explained in Section 3.3.2, on page 54, the
focused approach tended to require approximately twice as many timesteps to yield the
same number of schemas as the unfocused approach. This means that a real robot which
employed these methods would require twice as many experiments or twice as much time
trundling about in the world to learn the same facts. However, the reduction of the amount
of computation required to learn these facts by between one and two orders of magnitude17
means that the processor such a robot must employ could be much smaller and cheaper-
which would probably make the difference between having it onboard and not. This is even
more compelling when one realizes that these computational savings get bigger and bigger
as the robot learns more facts.
3.3.1.2 Correctness
The statistical machinery of the schema mechanism goes to great pains to avoid being
fooled by occasional coincidence. Only if some change in the state of the world is posi-
tively correlated with an action more often than it is negatively correlated, and only if we
have seen enough instances of both the event happening after some specific action and the
17. For runs of this length, e.g., 1000-2000 schemas generated.
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event not happening in the absence of the action, and if the event is unexplainable by any
other schemas, will the mechanism conclude that the action is truly the cause of the event.
(This is an overview of the marginal attribution mechanism described in Section 3.1.3.2,
on page 34, and in [Drescher 91].)
Because of this, the only way that any learning algorithm which uses this system could
learn "incorrect" facts (e.g., correlations that do not, in fact, reflect true correlations in the
world) would be to systematically exclude relevant evidence that indicates that a schema
that is thought to be reliable is in fact unreliable. No evidence of this was found in spot
checks of any test runs. It is believed (but not proven) that none of the focused algorithms
described can lead to such systematic exclusion of relevant information: the mechanism
may miss correct correlations (such is the tradeoff of having a focus of attention in the first
place), but it will not miss only those correlations that would tend to otherwise invalidate a
schema thought to be reliable.
3.3.2 Comparison of the different strategies
Figure 8, on page 55, presents partial results from several runs with different choices of
selectors. Only the most salient combinations of selectors were included in this table. Of
those, the rows in boldface will be discussed below; the non-boldfaced rows are included
to give a feel for how different choices can influence the results.
The results in this table were all produced by runs 5000 iterations long. Similar runs of
two or three times as long have produced comparable results, with correspondingly greater
increases in P (see below).
The first four columns of the table show the particular selectors in use for any given
run; the top row shows those selectors which correspond to the basic (Drescher) algorithm,
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Algorithm Learning Work required Facts per work unit
Spinoff selectors Statistic selectors Schemas Inner loops (x10 6) Reliable schemas over
Items Schemas Items Schema Total Rel T/R Spin Stat Both Spin Stats Both
AIN ASN AIN ASN 1756 993 1.77 533 533 1066 1.9 1.9 0.9
AIN ASN CINIH ABSPSDUCI 1135 403 2.82 398 12 410 1.0 33.6 1.0
AIN ASN AIN ABSPSDUCI 1110 518 2.14 391 55 446 1.3 9.4 1.2
CIN ASN AIN ASN 1693 948 1.79 44 524 568 21.5 1.8 1.7
CIN SWRUS AIN ASN 1395 791 1.76 2 463 466 316.4 1.7 1.7
CIN ABSPSDUCI AIN ASN 1622 924 1.76 15 510 525 61.6 1.8 1.8
CIN ASN AIN ABSPSDUCI 1110 506 2.19 33 54 87 15.3 9.4 5.8
CIN ABSPSDUCI AIN ABSPSDUCI 1110 506 2.19 10 54 64 50.6 9.4 7.9
CIN ABSPSDUCI CINIH ASN 1366 643 2.12 13 64 77 49.5 10.0 8.4
CIN ASN CINIH ABSPSDUCI 1136 399 2.85 34 12 46 11.7 33.3 8.7
CIN SWRUS AIN ABSPSDUCI 1102 498 2.21 1 53 54 415.0 9.4 9.2
CIN SWRUS CINIH ASN 1353 688 1.97 2 64 66 275.2 10.8 10.3
CIN ABSPSDUCI CINIH ABSPSDUCI 1136 399 2.85 10 12 22 40.7 33.3 18.3
CIN SWRUS CINIH ABSPSDUCI 1134 398 2.85 1 12 13 331.7 33.2 30.2
Figure 8: Summary of goal-independent results
The names for the algorithms used in learning are explained in Section 3.2.1 through
Section 3.2.3. Results from the rows in boldface are discussed in this section. The non-bold-
faced rows are not discussed in the text, but are included for additional context. This table
is a sampling; in all, in excess of 30 different combinations of selectors were investigated.
The top line is effectively the "unfocused" case, as in [Drescher 91]; the bottom line is
considered the "best" or most tightly-focused case.
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while the bottom row shows the most highly-focused algorithm, as described in
Section 3.2.3, on page 44.
The table is sorted in order by its last column, which shows number of reliable schemas
generated during the entire 5000-iteration run, divided by the amount of total work
required. For conciseness, we shall call the value in this column P, which is defined as:
SchemaRelTotal
Facts per work unit = $ = 
-6
Workrotalx10
where the multiplication by 10-6 is simply to normalize the resulting numbers to be near
unity, given the millionfold ratio between work units and number of schemas generated.
The bold rows in the table show successive changes to the selectors used, one at a time.
The top row is the basic algorithm, which shows that about a billion total inner loops were
required to learn 1756 schemas, 993 of which were reliable, which gives a P of 0.9.
Note that, because the world is stochastic (for example, the two "inanimate" objects
occasionally move from one square to a neighboring square, approximately every few hun-
dred clock ticks), one might imagine that there would be variance in the number and reli-
ability of schemas generated between two runs, even if they use the same strategy. In fact,
this is true, but the variance is quite low: out of a run of two or three thousand schemas with
the same strategy and different seeds for the random number generator (hence different
random behaviors in the world), the difference in the number of schemas generated is gen-
erally less than ten. In other words, the number of schemas generated is usually within 1%
between runs using the same algorithm. Further, the types of schemas generated also match
each other quite closely, as determined by n-way comparisons between runs, using the
techniques discussed in Section 3.3.1.1.1, on page 50. (The exact schemas generated will,
of course, be different, as discussed in Section 3.3.1.1, on page 49).
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Let us examine changes to the selectors for spinoffs, which determine the cognitive
selectivity, or what is attended to in learning new schemas from the existing schemas.
When we change Sping from AIN to CIN (e.g., from all item numbers to those whose items
changed at the last clock tick), the amount of work drops by about a factor of two, while
the number of generated schemas barely decreases. This means that virtually all schemas
made predictions about items which changed in the immediately preceding clock tick (e.g.,
that corresponding to the action just taken), hence looking any further back in time for
them costs us computation without a concomitant increase in utility.
Changing Spin, from ASN to SWRUS (e.g., from all schema numbers to those whose
statistics were recently updated), given that Sping is already using the selector CIN, yields
a small improvement in P (not visible at the precision in the table), and also a small
improvement in the ratio of reliable to total schemas. (Were Spin; not already CIN, the
improvement would be far more dramatic, as demonstrated in runs not shown in the table.)
Note, however, the enormous decrease in the amount of work done by the spinoff mecha-
nism when Spins changes from ASN to SWRUS, dropping from 10% of WorkTotal to 1%.
Next, let us examine the effects of perceptual selectivity. Changing Stats from ASN to
ABSPSDUCI (e.g., from all schema numbers to all bare schemas plus schemas dependent
upon changed items) increases P by a factor of 5.4, to 9.2, by decreasing the amount of
work required to update the perceptual statistics by almost an order of magnitude. In
essence, we are now only bothering to update the statistical information in the extended
context or extended result of a schema, for some particular sensory item in some particular
schema, if the schema depends upon that sensory item.
Finally, examine the last bold row, in which Stat; was changed from AIN to CINIH
(e.g., from all item numbers to all item numbers whose items changed in the last two clock
ticks). P increases by a factor of 3.2, relative to the previous case, as the amount of statis-
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tical-update work dropped by about a factor of four. We are now perceiving effectively
only those changes in sensory items which might have some bearing in spinning off a
schema which already references them.
Note that each successive tightening of the focus has some cost in the number of sche-
mas learned in a given number of iterations. This means that, e.g., a real robot would
require increasingly large numbers of experiments in the real world to learn the same facts.
However, this is not a serious problem, since, given the focus algorithm described here,
such a robot would require only about twice as many experiments, for any size run, as it
would in the unfocused algorithm. This means that its learning rate has been slowed down
by a small, roughly constant factor, while the computation required to do the learning has
dropped enormously.
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Chapter 4: Goal-dependent Learning
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discussed the influence of goals on reducing the work of learning. First, in
Section 4.2 below, it summarizes the fundamental impact of goals in the learning system
used here, and motivates the relation of goals to planning. In short, and as summarized in
Section 4.2 and explained at length in Section 4.3.1.1, on page 64, the key ideas in using
goals to focus are:
- Every goal has some built-in percepts and actions associated with it.
. Learning is restricted to those percepts and actions.
In Section 4.3, on page 63, we cover in depth the general concepts that will be required
to evaluate the results presented later. In Section 4.3.1, we go into much greater detail
about goals as they are used here, including their structure and more precisely how they are
used to focus the learning process. Then, in Section 4.3.2, on page 71, we discuss how to
evaluate the learning that has occurred, with emphasis on using planning to search the
space of generated schemas and so prove, via successful construction of plans, that the
schema system has indeed learned a relevant set of schemas for the given goals.
Finally, in Section 4.4, on page 86, we present some results from this paradigm, using
the terminology and mechanisms described in the aforementioned sections to describe the
amount of work required to learn, and the nature of the learning that has taken place.
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4.2 Why goals?
Goal-independent filtering is often insufficient to accomplish effective learning. With-
out goals, it is difficult to know what would be useful to learn, hence there is no way to
know a priori whether some particular fact needs to be learned or not. This leaves an agent
with the task of trying to learn everything, just in case it will be needed later.
This chapter investigates one way of adding goals to the learning process. The aim is to
reduce the amount of work performed, by reducing the scope of learning from every corre-
lation that appears in the microworld to those correlations that seem relevant for some par-
ticular set of goals.
Using goals allows us to define two sets which constrain the amount of work per-
formed, in a similar manner to the way in which the work of learning was reduced in
Chapter 3; furthermore, both the methods of Chapter 3 and the methods described in this
chapter may be combined, to decrease the work of learning in two ways at once.
For any given goal, the set of percepts defines those sensory items which this goal
allows the learning system to attend to. When updating item statistics, only these items are
updated; when deciding which schemas to spin off, only schemas dependent upon (e.g.,
making predictions about) those items are noticed. This same mechanism is used in a goal-
independent fashion in Section 3.2, on page 40.
Similarly, the set of actions defines which actions are allowable when this goal is
active. Typically, this set is "all actions" or "all eye motions" or "all hand motions," etc.
This constraint of percepts and actions is the central mechanism in this research by
which goals decrease the effort of learning; the rest of this chapter details how the mecha-
nism works, and how to evaluate it.
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Note that the word goal can mean many different things in different contexts. A goal
could be the final, end result desired from a long series of actions (e.g., strategic), or the
next small result that one desired (e.g., tactical), or something in between. This research
treats the word "goal" more as a tactical, e.g., short-range, pursuit, and chains such tactical
goals together to make larger, strategic or long-range, pursuits. This is explained in more
detail in Section 4.3.1.2, on page 68, when we show some representative goals used in this
system.
4.2.1 Where do goals come from?
In real creatures, goals may come from a variety of sources. Simple creatures (such as
insects, small mammals, etc) are generally directed essentially completely by instinct. In
this case, the animal's strategic goals are generally motivated by homeostasis concerns
(e.g., not getting get too hungry, thirsty, hot, or cold), and genetic concerns (e.g., mate
and/or care for offspring in the right season, etc). Its tactical goals are motivated by a com-
bination of these strategic goals and its immediate environment and situation (e.g., if the
animal is hungry and there is food nearby that appears edible, it eats it).
More complicated creatures have more complex sets of goals, enabled in general by
more complex and capable sensory systems and cognitive mechanisms of greater sophisti-
cation. As we walk up the phylogenetic tree towards human-level performance, the influ-
ence of instincts on choosing and following goals diminishes. Such more complicated
animals have more cognitive autonomy in choosing their own goals, formulating new
goals, and deciding how to carry them out. At the human cognitive level, we can confi-
dently assert that we can reason about our goals, use introspection to evaluate them, and so
forth. The mapping between some tactical or strategic goal and the resulting behavior has
become more and more divorced from a simple stimulus/response paradigm, and the
immediate environment plays less and less of a role in determining what the organism's
next action or next cognitive procedure shall be.
This research does not attempt to model such a high level of competence. Here, we treat
goals as they might be in an insect or simple animal. It is presumed, therefore, that the map-
ping from a goal to what actions might be performed, or what aspects of the world shall be
attended to, is hardwired into the organism; in a real organism, such hardwiring is presum-
ably accomplished evolutionarily, by favored survival and reproduction of creatures for
which the correct mapping of goal and current situation to cognitive focus and action
existed. Similarly, the complete set of possible goals is fixed in advance; the agent cannot
invent a new goal for itself.
In addition, the toplevel goal for any given run (whether it is a learning run, in which
case new schemas are being generated, or a performance run, in which schemas that were
generated earlier are being evaluated to determine the agent's competence) is chosen at the
beginning of the run, and is thus outside of the agent's control.
Goals and the ways in which we use them, both for learning and for evaluation of what
learning has taken place, are described in much more detail in Section 4.3.1, on page 63.
4.2.2 The relation of goals to planning
Pursuit of a strategic goal generally implies attempting a sequence of behaviors that is
intended to lead to the goal's successful completion. Since all but trivially simple worlds
generally require executing a series of such behaviors to get from the initial state to the goal
state, goal-oriented behavior leads immediately into the realm of planning.
The literature on planning is immense; this research does not explicitly attempt to
extend it. Instead, it uses some results from that prior art to implement goal-directed focus
of attention: in particular, it plans chains of tactical goals from some starting state to some
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strategic goal state. Plans and the ways in which we use them, both for learning and for
evaluation of what learning has taken place, are described in more detail in Section 4.3.2,
on page 71.
4.3 General concepts
The two most important concepts that must be understood in how we use goal-directed
learning are those of goals and plans. Goals and plans are used both to guide the learning
process, and to evaluate, after some learning has taken place, how competent the agent is,
e.g., whether or not it has learned any useful information about the results of its actions in
its environment.
4.3.1 Goals
As used here, a goal is primarily composed of a set of percepts (which determine which
sensory inputs will be attended to, and which schemas will be available for lookup in the
memory) and a list of permitted actions (which determine which actions are allowed).
Using this mechanism, it is possible to focus sensory and cognitive attention to a particular
subset of all possible inputs for a given goal, and it is also possible to restrict the actions
available for execution to those that might be useful for the goal.
There is little distinction in this system between strategic and tactical goals. In general,
goals are treated as tactical (e.g., each one defines a relatively simple desired change from
the current perceived state of the world to the intended state), and these tactical goals are
chained together to make more complicated and long-range goals. However, the system
does not treat a chain of such goals as some more complicated (strategic) goal in and of
itself, and has no representation for "a goal composed of several subgoals." Instead, it rep-
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resents the set of tactical goals in any given run as a finite-state machine, executing the
transition from one tactical goal to another when each such goal claims that it is satisfied.
When talking about evaluating the competence of a set of schemas (in order words, did
the schemas learned enable the system to reach some particular goal),to reach the goal
denotes some particular tactical goal which is distinguished as the goal. This goal is like
any other goal in the system, except that it also tells the FSM that it is time to record a suc-
cess and to try another test goal. Hence, to "reach the goal" is terminological shorthand for
to "reach the strategic goal," which is itself short for "to reach the goal which has the dis-
tinguished marker stating that this is the end goal, whose satisfaction should be recorded as
a success in accomplishing some strategic pursuit."
The FSM evaluates the various parts of the active goals,1 and decides which new
goal(s) should become active, at each clock tick; thus, for each clock tick, we take an action
from the set of actions permitted by the currently-active goals, update the internal represen-
tation of those sensory bits that the active goals allow us to observe, run the learning system
one clock tick, and advance the FSM one transition.
4.3.1.1 The structure of goals
There are several pieces or slots which make up a complete goal. The complete struc-
ture of a goal, excluding certain implementation-specific slots used for internal housekeep-
ing, is therefore as follows. Remember that these goals are essentially tactical goals, and
that each goal contains the information inside it which specifies which tactical goals may
become active when it declares itself to have succeeded.
- Name. The name of this goal. (This is how one goal refers to some other
goal, and how the programmer can specify which goal is which.)
1. There can be more than one goal active at a time; see the next section.
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- Percepts. Set of which items that this goal allows the learning system to at-
tend to.
- Actions. Set of which actions this goal allows the learning system to take.
- Concurrent. Which other goals to pursue at the same time. (These other,
concurrent goals add their percept and action sets in to those defined in this
goal, and the union of all of them makes up the set of percepts and actions
that are attended to at the moment.)
- Next. Which other goal (singular!) to pursue next, if this goal claims to have
succeeded on this clock tick.
- Lose. Goal to (maybe) transition to if this goal does not succeed on this
clock tick.
- Win. A function called to determine this goal's success (used while learn-
ing).
" Schemas-final. A function called to determine membership in FINAL (used
while chaining to goals; the meaning of FINAL will be defined in
Section 4.3.2.5.4, on page 81).
The set of percepts defines those sensory items which this goal allows the learning sys-
tem to attend to. When updating item statistics, only these items are updated; when decid-
ing which schemas to spin off, only schemas dependent upon (e.g.,making predictions
about) those items are noticed. This same mechanism is used in a goal-independent fashion
in Section 3.2, on page 40.
Similarly, the set of actions defines which actions are allowable when this goal is
active. Typically, this set is "all actions" or "all eye motions" or "all hand motions," etc.
The WIN slot for a goal, if specified, contains a function which is run to determine
whether or the goal is considered to have succeeded. This function is particular to each
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goal, and generally specifies some combination of sensory items whose state must be on,
off, or don't-care for the goal to succeed.
Goals can inherit from other goals; this is a way of easily and modularly building up
more complex goals from simpler goals. If goal A has a concurrent slot that mentions goal
B, then A inherits the percepts and actions of B, increasing the number of possible percepts
and actions that A has available. (In other words, inheriting from another goal can only
increase the number of sensory bits attended to, or the number of permitted actions, and can
never decrease it.)
Suppose, as above, that goal A inherits from goal B. The inheritance is actually man-
aged by running both goals in parallel; there is nothing preventing A from inheriting from
B while B is inheriting from A. Both of their WIN slots, for example, will be evaluated, and
whichever one wins chooses the NEXT slot that determines which next goal state will
result.
If, in this case, A claims to have won, and B does not, then its choice of the next goal
completely overrides whatever B's NEXT slot might claim. The FSM transitions to the
goal named by A's NEXT slot, completely abandoning A and any other concurrent goals
that were running at the same time (e.g., B).
If both A and B both claim to win during the same clock tick, then the real winner (the
one whose NEXT slot chooses the next goal) is undefined; one or the other will be chosen
arbitrarily.
The reason that this parallelism is called "inheritance" stems from what happens if B,
to use the example above, fails to mention any WIN, NEXT, etc, slots. In that case, B can-
not possibly influence which goal is picked next, but only what sensory items are attended
to or actions are possible; A has inherited B's "focus."
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Given the above, we run a finite-state-machine, using the goals as a simple rule-based
system-the goals determine under what conditions the FSM will transition to the next
state, and what state that will be. First, we call the WIN slot, to see if the goal is satisfied
or not. Once we have decided whether the goal is satisfied or not, we have two choices. If
the goal was satisfied, then we transition to the goal named in the NEXT slot for this goal.
If the goal was not satisfied, then we remember the goal named in the LOSE slot, and we
try any other concurrent goals that may exist. (Note that the order in which we try concur-
rent goals is undefined and should be viewed as "simultaneous"-this is why it is unde-
fined which goal's NEXT slot will be used if they both claim to win.) If none of them
succeed, then we pick the next goal randomly from the goals in the LOSE slots. If none of
the concurrent goals had any LOSE goals defined, then we stick in the current goal. (This
allows us to define a goal that we cannot come out of, assuming no concurrent goals are
being run with it, by failing to define anything for the LOSE slot. On the other hand, we
can avoid getting stuck by making sure that at least one concurrent goal has this defined.)
The actual implementation of the FSM piggybacks somewhat upon the implementation
of goal-independent learning described in Section 3.2, on page 40. In particular, the itera-
tors that determine which schemas and sensory items are attended to (see Section 3.2.3, on
page 44) are masked by the set of active percepts and allowed actions, such that the existing
goal-independent iterators may be reused. The masking action allows the goal-dependent
part of the algorithm to use the logic from the goal-independent part of the system
untouched; adding goals will never increase the number of attended items or schemas, and
usually decreases it. However, using goals does not necessary mean that the goal-indepen-
dent system must be running in the most tightly-focused mode as described in
Section 3.2.3, on page 44; in particular, were one to wish to, one could run the goal-depen-
dent system while using the full-crossbar (e.g., most inefficient) mode of the goal-indepen-
Goal-dependent LearningChapter 4
dent system. (There seems little or no reason to ever want to do so, but it would certainly
be trivially possible to do so.)
There is an important additional detail about the way the FSM runs. It is not always the
case that the action taken is drawn from the set of goal-dependent currently-permitted
actions. A fixed percentage of the time (at the moment, 10%), the set of allowed actions is
expanded to include all possible actions. Why is this done? Because, especially in the case
of the infant/eyehand microworld, the microworld is relatively static. (So-called inanimate
objects move around every few hundred clock ticks, and the hand never moves unless com-
manded.)
Consider what would happen in, e.g., the infant/eyehand scenario if the goal system did
not occasionally allow a completely random action to take place. Suppose that the goal set
being run was one which tried to learn how moving the eye affects what is seen, and that
the hand was never allowed to move. This relatively-static microworld would otherwise
falsely teach the learning system that, e.g., the hand is always in some particular position,
because the agent was never allowed to move it. When it then came to take action based on
what the agent had learned, this belief that the hand never moved would cause many plans
to go awry.
Thus, in worlds in which nothing much happens unless it is in response to an action
taken by the agent, it is important to occasionally allow the agent to take an action which
seems unrelated to what it is currently trying to learn-otherwise, it may falsely learn
things it believes to be always true which are instead simply true when the agent is not per-
mitted to take some particular action.
4.3.1.2 Using goals for learning
A typical use of these tactical goals for learning is to concentrate effort on a particular
strategic goal deemed useful for some reason.2 In this case, such a strategic goal would be
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"center an object in the visual field," "identify what object is in the visual field" (which
requires at least getting it into some foveal region, where enough detail is available to do
so), "grasp an object," and so on.
A typical set of goals which comprise an FSM for identifying an object appears in
Figure 9, on page 69. This FSM was designed for the infant/eyehand scenario; the Ham-
General Scan
? VP+VF
Move Eye
START
General Scan High Res Scan Into
Until In Fovea Dead Center
WI| {VFFovea} WI VFDead-ctr -
Wait A Random Time
WIN Random> Threshold '
! Any Action
Figure 9: A typical set of goals
SUCCESS
Identify Without
Scanning
Fovea
WINE V Details=OK
LO SEJ
sterdam FSM for the same task is similar. In this chart, percepts are denoted by a "?" and
permitted actions by "!". The use of VP+VF in the percepts for General Scan, for example,
indicates that visual-proprioceptive and coarse-visual sensory items should be attended to,
and the rest ignored (assuming, of course, that no other concurrent goal adds to this set).
VFFovea and VFDead-ctr denote a WIN function that succeeds if any sensory item corre-
sponding to "somewhere in the fovea" or "dead-center in the fovea" is on, respectively.
Similarly, the WIN slot in the goal Identify Without Scanning specifies that all the details
2. Such strategic goals are currently declared useful by the programmer, not by the system.
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(from the fine-foveal bits) of the object must match some target set of details for the goal
to declare that it has succeeded.
The FSM shows that the goals General Scan Until in Fovea and High Res Scan Into
Dead Center both inherit percepts and actions from General Scan (the hands show the
inheritance pathway). When General Scan Until in Fovea succeeds, the FSM transitions to
High Res Scan Into Dead Center; when that succeeds, the FSM transitions into Identify
Without Scanning, which finally transitions to a state which simply waits a random amount
of time to let the world random-walk away from the goal state. 3 Then we repeat the exer-
cise.
Expressed in a more general fashion, the idea in this goal set is to notice an object
somewhere in the (coarse) visual field, scan until it is in the fovea (in this goal, we first scan
until it is somewhere in any coarse visual item corresponding to the position of the fovea,
then scan with the foveal fine-detail bits enabled while we try to get the item dead-centered
in the fovea), then to attempt to identify it using the foveal detail sensory bits.
This FSM is actually slightly more than is necessary; for example, in the two micro-
worlds used here, having an object anywhere in the foveal region is sufficient to get enough
detail to identify it. However, in order to make the goal somewhat harder and more inter-
esting to achieve (given that the area occupied by the fovea is relatively high in both micro-
worlds), we insist that the object be exactly centered before attempting to identify it. (In the
Hamsterdam scenario, instead of insisting that the object be "centered," we insist that it be
"in the center foveal ray and at very short range.")
3. See Section 4.3.2.7, on page 83, for why this random walk is necessary. In short, the idea is to allow the
state of the world to decay away from the strategic goal, by allowing random events to transpire. If we did
not do this, then we would immediately try to get to that goal again, and presumably succeed immediately.
This would not be very informative.
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4.3.2 Evaluating learning
The simplest way to evaluate what the schema system has learned is to use the same
methods as in Chapter 3, namely, to count schemas and to count the work required to gen-
erate them. In Section 4.4.1, on page 86, we do exactly this for a typical example of a goal-
directed run. But what exactly does this mean? After all, with the introduction of goals,
entire swaths of domain knowledge may be purposely omitted, in order to concentrate
computational effort on different areas of the domain-consider, for example, that there
will be no schemas in the example above which talk about hand motion, since none of the
goals in the run allow movement of the hand, nor do any of those goals allow the percep-
tion of any hand-related sensory items.4 Consider also that the number of conjunctions and
synthetic items generated in a goal-directed run is much larger than that for a non-goal-
directed run (see Section 4.4.2); what are we to make of this?
In Section 3.3.1, on page 49, we glossed over the issue of exactly what the schema sys-
tem had learned in various configurations. The introduction of goals makes such evaluation
more problematic. Different choices of goals lead to different information being learned.
The techniques used in Section 3.3.1, can no longer be assumed sufficient a priori; instead,
in this section and succeeding sections, we shall examine the issue of what the system has
learned much more rigorously.
Note that the planning process described in this section is sufficient to understand the
results presented below in Section 4.4. However, a naive implementation of the planner
described quickly runs afoul of many O(n3) or even exponential-time complexity blowups.
Appendix B briefly describes some strategies for dealing with these problems in order to
4. Even though Section 4.3.1.1, on page 64 specifies that the agent is occasionally allowed to execute a
completely random action, unspecified by any goal, the set of allowable percepts is not similarly expanded.
Thus, though the hand in this example may randomly be allowed to move, hand-related items such as haptic-
proprioceptive or tactile senses will not be perceived anyway.
do planning in a reasonable amount of time; it may safely be skipped without loss of con-
tinuity.
4.3.2.1 Using chaining to evaluate learning
Instead of the more qualitative methods described above, here we turn to simulation to
evaluate the knowledge expressed by a collection of schemas. The simulation consists of
putting the schema system in a particular state of the microworld, specifying a goal, and
evaluating how often there is sufficient stored knowledge to predict how to reach the goal
from the starting state.
There are several ways in which one might proceed. We examine some of the options
here. Next, we look at whether or not to learn while performing the evaluation, and later
sections examine some details of running the simulations themselves.
4.3.2.2 Should we learn during evaluation?
Should we learn additional schemas while attempting to reach the goal? In the work
reported here, this is not the case; the learning part of the schema system (e.g., updating
statistics of sensory items, and spinning off new schemas) is inhibited during the simula-
tion or evaluation phases. This is in part to keep from muddying the waters (continuing to
learn would mean that, the longer a simulation ran, the more knowledge would be available
for it or for future runs with different parameters, complicating comparison), and in part for
issues having to do with speed of evaluation (certain techniques used in the evaluation
would be more difficult or run much more slowly if learning during the simulation was
allowed; in particular, many of the caching strategies described below in Appendix B
would fail).
In general, of course, a real agent should not suppress learning while attempting to
reach a goal; this is done here simply as a convenience. There are also other solutions than
the sort of planning involved here; for example, the composite action mechanism of
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[Drescher 91], especially when combined with the intrumental and delegated values mech-
anisms defined there, shows one way to plan paths to goals that is particularly efficient on
parallel hardware.
4.3.2.3 When to plan?
If one is planning a path from an initial state to a goal state, and if the path is longer than
a single step, a natural question to be addressed is whether to replan the path at each step
towards the goal.
Nonincremental, or ballistic,5 planning, in which the path to be followed is planned
once, at the start, and then executed open-loop until it is played out, has the advantage of
being faster to compute than incremental, or closed-loop, planning, since the plan must
only be generated once per attempt. This, of course, assumes a situation in which generat-
ing the entire plan is feasible. If the space to be planned in has an exponential computa-
tional complexity-as is almost always the case-then such open-loop planning takes a
very long time. If we are allowed to plan only partway to the goal, and then replan, we start
to approximate incremental planning.
On the other hand, if we plan the complete path from the current state to the goal state
at every timestep, we can cope better with failures of the plan en route. Intermediate solu-
tions (e.g., build a partial or complete plan, execute it for some number of steps, and check
along the way for certain "disaster" indications and replan if so) are also common in the
planning literature.
The approach taken here is twofold. Some runs were performed with completely ballis-
tic planning, in which the plan was formulated and the entire sequence of actions was car-
ried out, after which the state of the microworld was checked to see if we were in the goal
state. (But see Section 4.3.2.5, on page 79, for a slight modification to this procedure which
5. By comparison with ballistic, e.g., open-loop, movements such as ocular saccades.
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more accurately describes how planning was performed.) Other runs were performed with
incremental planning, in which the entire plan was completely replanned at every timestep.
4.3.2.4 How to plan?
4.3.2.4.1 Chaining
When building a plan from some starting state to the goal state (often referred to here
as chaining, e.g., building a chain of schemas which reflects, at each step of the plan, what
action to take to cause one world state to be transformed into the next desired state), one
must decide what validly constitutes a plan.
As described here, a plan consists of a series of schemas. The first schema in the plan
has a context which is satisfied. In other words, the schema's context, for any items which
it asserts either positively or negatively, accurately describes the states of those sensory
items which it specifies. Don't-care items in its context (i.e., most of them) are allowed to
take on any value in the world (on, off, or unknown). This is the standard definition of the
applicability of a schema from [Drescher 91].
The last schema in the plan has a context which is considered satisfied when the world
is in the goal state. In other words, the last schema is applicable when the goal has suc-
ceeded. Note that this schema's action should not be executed as part of the plan, since it is
this schema's context that we are interested in; its result (which would probably obtain if
we executed its action) would take us one step past the goal state into some other state.
When talking about the length of a plan, however, we ignore this special "last" schema and
talk only about the number of actions that would be taken to execute the plan; thus, the
notion of plan length is identically equal to the number of actions we expect to take.
In the simplest case, a chain of schemas composing a plan would look something like
A/FOO/B, B/BAR/C, C/BAZ/D, etc, where the result of one schema is the context of the next
schema. This plan specifies, "If sensory item A from the microworld is asserted, then tak-
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ing the actions FOO and BAR in that order will probably lead to sensory item c being
asserted." 6
4.3.2.4.2 Path metrics
The second major question about planning consists of evaluating whether a plan is any
good. In the case of the microworlds investigated here, it is generally the case that a typical
goal state might be reachable from the given starting state via several thousand paths-
having 30,000 paths to choose from is quite common, for example. By almost any reason-
able metric, most of these plans are quite poor:
- Many depend upon an initial schema whose context is null (meaning, "don't
look at any sensory items; just assume that this plan will succeed, ignoring
the prior state of the world-such a plan is called a contextless start or a
desperation plan).
- Many others are improbably long or contain redundant steps ("move the eye
left; now move it right; now move it left again," etc: there would be an infi-
nite number of such plans if we allowed a schema to appear more than once
in any given plan (we do not-see Appendix B); as it is, the number of such
paths is merely very large.
- Many other plans contain one or more schemas with low reliability, in some
cases vanishingly small.
- Other plans might contain a schema such as A/FOO/A, 7 which says that, "If
sensory bit A is true, and we take action FOO, A is still true thereafter" -if
6. This becomes less simple when either contexts or results are conjunctive. Are plans such as A/FOo/B&C,
B/BAR/D or A/FOO/B&C, B&C&D/BAR/E valid plans? As implemented here, the former is a valid plan, while
the latter is not a valid plan. Why? In the case of the former plan, it is clear that the first schema expects that
both B and C should be asserted after FOo happens; if this is in fact the case, then executing BAR (which only
requires B) is fine; therefore, these two schemas chain. On the other hand, in the case of the latter plan, the
first schema only predicts that two items should be asserted if action FOo is taken, yet the second schema
will not be applicable unless an additional item (D) is asserted that the first schema did not predict. Since this
is unlikely, these two schemas do not chain.
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we did not somehow penalize paths for excessive length, then many paths
might contain such "no-operation" schemas, since clearly inserting such a
schema can be done in any case in which A is true.
Given all this, how are we to choose a reasonable path? We implement a path metric
which, given a path, computes its merit; we then use the path which has the highest merit.
(This path consists of all schemas whose actions we should take; it does not include the
special "last" schema, as described above in Section 4.3.2.4.1, on page 74.) This is surpris-
ingly tricky to do right; certain apparently-reasonable path metrics lead to grossly unstable
planning behavior. Let us examine some of these cases.
- Case 1. The most obvious path metric is to simply multiply all the reliabil-
ities together of the individual schemas making up the path. In other words,
if Rn is the reliability of some schema n in a path, then the merit M of the
entire path is simply M = HRn.
n
This simple metric leads to unfortunate consequences. Since all schemas
have reliabilities strictly less than one, it tends to favor shorter paths, which
appears reasonable on the surface. But, since the only thing the metric no-
tices is reliability, what this really means is that it favors very short paths
with very reliable schemas-with no concern for whether the individual
schemas in the path say anything that actually helps get to the end goal. In
practice, the paths are almost useless: the cost of adding even one additional
schema to some path is so high that it is never worthwhile to do so-even if
adding some schema is exactly what would make it more likely to reach the
end goal.
e Case 2. The major problem with Case 1 above is that the paths were insuf-
ficiently predictive of the world's behavior. An easy fix is to make the merit
7. For example, in the infant/eyehand world, there are many reliable schemas of the form
HPO2/HANDF/HPO2, which says, "If the hand is already fully forward, trying to move it forward will not do
anything."
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of any individual schema proportional to both its reliability R and to the
number of items it mentions in its context (Ic) and result (IR). Thus, for
two schemas, both of cardinality IT = I + I, and reliability R, we should
favor the one with a higher value of Ir *
Naively applying this approach, by making a schema's merit
M = R - IT, leads to disaster. In general, schemas mention at least one
context item and one result item (the exception being schemas with null
contents); thus, typical schemas have IT 2. This implies that M for a typ-
ical schema is greater than unity; this tends to exert a strong bias in favor of
longer paths, as long as each step in the path contains a schema whose
IT 2. The resulting paths are highly redundant, consisting of many ac-
tions followed at some point by their inverses, and the sheer length of the
paths, even ignoring its redundancy, makes them quite unlikely to ever suc-
ceed.
Case 3. The next obvious refinement to Case 2 above is to normalize the
cardinality of each schema before computing its merit by dividing the raw
cardinality IT by the total number of sense bits that could be on in any sche-
ma. If this latter number is ITOTAL, this new approach specifies
M = R- 2- IT . (We have to double ITOTAL in the denominator, since
TOTAL
a schema that made a prediction about every item in both its context and re-
sult would have a cardinality of 2 - ITOTAL ')
Alas, this approach fails also, for the opposite reason as Case 2. By nor-
malizing in this fashion, we exert a very strong selective pressure for short
paths-because no schema has more than a few percent of all items speci-
fied, every schema added to the path beats down the total merit by approx-
imately two orders of magnitude. Given that, no reliability, no matter how
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good, can hope to beat the negative effects of lengthening the path by even
one schema, so we tend to go for the shortest possible path (e.g., one action,
i.e., two schemas, of which we do not count the last one). Among all possi-
ble one-action paths, we then pick the one with the biggest individual merit,
which might favor a relatively unreliable schema (which should thus be of
low merit) that just happens to have a large number of items. This was seen
immediately in a run in the infant/eyehand scenario, wherein we picked a
path of /EYEL/(VF20&VF21) (a schema with a null context), which, not un-
surprisingly considering its lack of context, had a reliability of only
3.47-1014: ridiculously small, but probably the best individual merit of the
applicable schemas (e.g., those whose result mentioned some item we need
to be on for the goal to be satisfied)-of which most probably only had one
item in their result, so they lost.
Case 4. Rather than normalizing merit by multiplying reliability by cardi-
nality, this approach exponentiates reliability to the cardinality, e.g.,
M = R . It tends to push relatively reliable schemas that mention several
items up near, but certainly never above, unity, while very quickly beating
relatively unreliable schemas into the dust (and the more items they men-
tion, the worse such unreliable schemas will fare). Note carefully that this is
not the normalized cardinality defined in Case 3 above. That would basical-
ly yield the same answer as Case 3 itself did (and did, when it was acciden-
tally written that way at first), because we would be exponentiating to tiny
powers (like 10-14 or whatever), rather than to small positive integer powers
instead (like 2 or 4).
The path metric actually used for the results presented here was therefore that in Case 4
above.
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4.3.2.5 Exceptional conditions while planning
4.3.2.5.1 Actions having "no effect"
The planning situation is slightly more complicated than described above. At each step
of plan execution, we check to see if the previous step led to no change in the perceived
state of the external world, e.g., no changed primitive items. If so, we assume that the
action had no effect and therefore that the plan would not succeed even if we ran to com-
pletion. (The most common case in which this is true is when attempting to take an action
that would move the eye or the hand out of bounds, e.g., attempting to move the eye left-
ward when it is already as far left as it can go, etc; in the infant/eyehand world, for instance,
if one uses a world exactly the size described in Section 2.2.1, on page 22, and in
[Drescher 91], moving the eye at random will encounter a limit stop and result in no effect
exactly 1/3 of the time.) While it is possible that a perfectly valid action might have no
effect some of the time, and therefore it should simply be tried again if nothing seems to
change, it is unlikely in the microworlds used here, and we must in any event decide how
many times to try again before concluding that the action will never have the predicted
effect; in this case, our threshold for making such a decision is one trial.
4.3.2.5.2 Serendipity
In addition to checking for cases in which the agent's actions seem to have no effect,
we also check for serendipitous completion of the goal. In the simple microworlds used
here, the chances for reaching the goal state are nontrivial; for very simple goals (e.g., get
anything into any of the five coarse foveal visual regions, etc), the chances can be 10-20%
that taking any of the actions permitted by the goal at random might nonetheless lead to a
goal state. (For more complex goals, or in more complex microworlds, the chances of ser-
endipitous completion can be arbitrarily low, of course-assuming that we start far enough
from the goal state; see Section 4.3.2.7, on page 83, for some comments on that.)
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Therefore, at each step in plan execution, we check for a serendipitous outcome,
defined as reaching the goal state when there are still actions awaiting execution. Such a
serendipitous result is not considered a planning success, since if it was because of some
feature of the microworld (e.g., given enough knowledge, one might have predicted it),
then it clearly indicates missing knowledge that should have been learned (and would have
resulted in a shorter generated plan).
4.3.2.5.3 Goal loops
If incremental replanning is enabled during some run (meaning that the agent plans the
entire path to the goal anew each time it takes an action), there is a possibility of goal loops.
Such loops have been observed, and take the form of (say) a plan saying A/FOO/B, B/BAR/C,
CIBAZID on some particular iteration. After taking action FOO, we then replan, and happen
to get (say) B/BIFF/A, A/BOO/D, D/BAZ/C. We take action BIFF, replan, and end up with a new
plan of A/FOO/B, B/BAR/C, C/BAZ/D again. (One particularly popular loop seen during one
run involved a period-four loop (e.g., it took four actions to repeat itself), with two two-
action plans and two three-action plans involved in the loop.)
In order to avoid this sort of pathological behavior, the number of times that replanning
happens when pursuing a particular single goal from a starting state is tracked; if this num-
ber goes above a threshold, we assume that the large number of replans indicates that we
are in a loop, and the current attempt to reach the goal is declared a failure. While it would
certainly be possible to keep track of every single plan generated while pursuing some
attempt at a goal, and immediately declare that we are in a loop if a repeat is seen, the
approach taken has the features of simplicity and, perhaps, robustness-if something went
wrong while executing a plan due to some unpredictable event (such as a random motion
of an object outside of our control), and the replanned path happens to be the same as some
previous path in this attempt, we should not gratuitously abandon the attempt. Simply
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counting replans and aborting if the count exceeds a threshold works well in practice and
is quite easy to implement, especially considering that planning loops are relatively rare
anyway-though quite destructive if not caught.
This approach to avoiding loops has an intuitive feel like that of avoiding boredom-if
some series of actions seems highly repetitious, we have been doing them for a long time,
and the goal still has not been reached, perhaps it is time to give up on the attempt.
4.3.2.5.4 Other ways to be stymied
Many other things can go wrong while attempting to plan a path to a goal. This section
details a few of the ways which we track explicitly. In all such cases, such a planning fail-
ure results in the complete abandonment of this attempt to reach the goal; we do a relax-
ation cycle to recover (see Section 4.3.2.7, on page 83).
When planning a path to a goal, we attempt to compute a path from some schema in the
set INITIAL (consisting of all schemas whose contexts are currently satisfied by the cur-
rently-sensed state of the world) to some schema in the set FINAL (consisting of all sche-
mas whose contents would be satisfied if the goal were to be satisfied). It may be that either
one of these sets might be empty; this could happen if we know so few schemas (or so few
schemas relevant to the current goal) that we cannot find even one such schema that could
be satisfied in either the start or goal states. Such "stymied" configurations are referred to
as stymied-initial or stymied-final, respectively.
It may also be the case that, even though INITIAL and FINAL are both nonempty, we
still cannot find any path, no matter how bad, between at least one schema in each set. Such
a failure is a stymied-can't-start failure, in which we cannot even start the planning pro-
cess. A similar failure can occur if incremental replanning is allowed, in which we sud-
denly find, during a replan, that there is no path from the schemas in the current INITIAL
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set (remember, this set will change with each change to the microworld) to FINAL. Such a
failure is a stymied-can't-continue failure.
It may also be that the current state of the microworld, combined with the current goal,
is such that some schema is in both INITIAL and FINAL simultaneously. This would indi-
cate that, given the way the goal is specified, we need take no action to reach the goal-we
are already in it. Such a situation is called a short-circuit.
This is distinct from a situation in which no element appears in both INITIAL and
FINAL, yet the current state of the world is such that the context of some schema in FINAL
is already satisfied. Such a situation is a done-at-start situation; we just happened to decide
to reach a goal that we are already at.
4.3.2.6 Planning for learning versus planning for evaluation
As described above, the way that goals are used for learning are slightly different from
the way that goals are used for evaluation of schemas. In particular, when learning, we run
an FSM to determine which goal to execute after the current goal. In evaluation, we pick a
goal in advance, and build a chain composed of schemas we may find in the memory to
attempt to plan from the starting state to the goal state.
There is nothing in particular which stops us from running an FSM during evaluation
as well; such a mechanism would constrain which schemas might possibly participate in a
plan in the same way that the goal mechanism constrains which sensory items and schemas
may participate in learning. However, since we are interested here in evaluating how much
has already been learned by some prior run of the schema system, it seemed more appro-
priate to allow all possible schemas that have been learned to participate in path planning
(though see Section 4.3.2.8, on page 84, for an exception to this).
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4.3.2.7 Randomizing the world
It is very often the case that the current state of the world is unsuitable for performing
an evaluation of the schema system's knowledge base.8 Most of the reasons have been
mentioned above; for example, being stymied in some way (see Section 4.3.2.5.4, on
page 81) is the direct result of an interaction of the current goal and the current state of the
microworld.
In most cases of being stymied, immediate abandonment of the plan is indicated. These
cases are stymied-short-circuit, stymied-can't-start, stymied-can't-continue, stymied-ini-
tial, and stymied-final. In these cases, we take aimless steps by taking a fixed number of
actions totally at random. By taking random actions, we side-effect the world in various
ways; the world also has a chance to allow any other events that may happen independent
of our actions to happen as well. The end result of this "aimlessness" is to do a random-
walk away from whatever point in state-space caused us to be stymied. After this random
walk, it makes sense to try the evaluation again on the current goal. If the agent repeatedly
tries to evaluate given some goal, and repeatedly has to aimlessly wander away due to a
planning failure, eventually it passes a threshold (denoted below as being frustrated) and
abandons the goal, entering a relaxation cycle as described immediately below.
Other cases indicate abandonment of the goal itself. Not all of these cases are necessar-
ily planning failures. If the agent is stymied because some action had no effect (e.g., sty-
mied-no-effect), or if it succeeded serendipitously, or if it was frustrated by having to do too
much aimless wandering, these are planning failures; however, successful completion of
the goal at the predicted instant (e.g., at the end of the plan) is a planning success. In these
cases, the agent relaxes, also by taking random actions, in an attempt to random-walk away
8. This is independent of the state of the knowledge base. For instance, if we have just succeeded in get-
ting to some end goal, and then try to run an evaluation to that same end goal, we surely should not start
from where we left off, because it would take zero steps to get to the goal. This would tell us nothing.
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from the current state; this is identical to "aimlessness" as described above, though the
number of steps taken during relaxation may or may not be the same (in the current system,
they happen to be the same). When done relaxing, the agent takes the another goal from the
set of goals being used to evaluate the competence of the knowledge base, and starts over.
4.3.2.8 Lobotomies
It is often useful to evaluate, not only how one set of goals compares to another in pro-
ducing useful learning for some task, but how fast that learning takes place, or after how
many facts are learned that the agent may be said to be competent.
In general, this was done by generating a full knowledge base and then lobotomizing it
by making some percentage of it invisible to the evaluation system, simulating earlier
states of knowledge.
4.3.2.9 Scorecards
Given all the above, an overview of the evaluation process is straightforward. For any
given evaluation, we must decide the conditions under which the evaluation takes place,
namely:
- the knowledge base of schemas to be evaluated
- which goals will be used
e the extent of any lobotomies
e whether or not incremental replanning is allowed
Once these parameters are chosen, the procedure for evaluating a run is to repeatedly
attempt to reach a goal from the starting state, as described above. If multiple goals are
specified, we round-robin among them; this makes it more likely, even with aimless or
relaxation, that the next goal to be evaluated will not have the state of the world already
preset to a goal-satisfied configuration. Very often, runs will include various cross-product
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settings of the parameters (e.g., trying several goals, with and without incremental replan-
ning, over some set of lobotomy values).
Such simulation runs are organized into a system of scorecards; each scorecard is
keyed by the name of some goal. A scorecard is essentially a bag of state, reflecting many
of the quantities above, plus a few new ones. The complete list is:
- N: Number of times the agent has tried with this goal.
- Goal: The goal the agent is trying to achieve.
- Wins: How many times the agent was able to plan and reach the goal; does
not include serendipity or aimless-wins.
- Stymied-initial: How many times the agent was not even able to begin plan-
ning (INITIAL empty).
- Stymied-final: How many times the agent was not even able to begin plan-
ning (FINAL empty).
- Stymied-can't-start: How many times the agent could not compute an initial
plan.
- Stymied-can't-continue: How many times the agent was suddenly unable to
continue after a replan (no new plan can be formed).
- Stymied-short-circuit: How many times the agent was suddenly short-cir-
cuited.
- Stymied-no-effect: How many times no primitive items were changed by the
action the agent just took.
- Serendipity: How many times the agent succeeded earlier than the current-
ly-amended plan thought it would.
- Done-at-start: How many times the agent was done before taking any ac-
tion at all.
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- Replans: How many times the current plan changed (ignoring simple short-
ening as it is executed).
- Replan-loops: How many times the agent exceeded the maximum permissi-
ble number of replans when trying to collect a card.
e Aimless-steps: Number of aimless steps the agent took while hoping to en-
counter a state it could plan from.
- Totally-frustrated: Number of times the agent gave up after being aimless
too long.
- Ave-winning-plan-length: Average length of any winning plan or replan
(from when it was initially planned, not at the end, of course).
- Ave-serendipitous-plan-length: Average length of the remaining length of
the plan when it was discovered that the plan was serendipitously done.
- Contextless-path-starts: Number of times the agent picked a schema with
an empty context as the start of the best path.
The results presented below make use of this terminology and organization of score-
cards.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 The work required for learning with goals
Goals can exert a powerful effect on the work required to learn. Figure 10, on page 88,
shows that a run with goals as described above in Figure 9 leads to substantially less work
than the goal-independent case, for similar numbers of schemas. For comparison purposes,
this chart uses the same microworld as the chart shown in Chapter 3, which was run in the
infant/eyehand scenario. 9
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This is quite similar to the sort of results obtained in goal-independent learning. After
all, in the model used in this research, the imposition of goals can only decrease the number
of percepts which are attended to, either by the sensory or the cognitive systems. Hence
they will tend to act as selectors or filters, just as in the goal-independent case. The effect
of the restriction of possible actions is less clear in advance; as the table demonstrates,
however, adding goals in fact serves to greatly increase the efficiency, in terms of compu-
tational work.
However, this is not the whole story. After all, as explained at great length in
Section 4.3.2, on page 71, goals can dramatically and qualitatively change the nature of
what facts are learned about the world, by directing the learning effort away from particular
features and toward others. The following sections will investigate those effects.
4.4.2 Changes in the characteristics of the schemas learned
One of the most obvious effects of learning with a particular goal in place is that very
few schemas addressing parts of the world that are not deemed relevant by the goal are
generated. Consider the goal shown in Figure 9, on page 69. This goal is concerned with
building competence at centering objects in the visual field and identifying them. As such,
it does not attempt to manipulate the objects. Because this is so, the goal never allows the
hand to move, which means that the agent will never discover what would happen if it did
move the hand. (This is not completely true, because of the occasional randomness dis-
cussed in Figure 4.3.1.1, on page 64-but it is virtually true.)
9. Some analogous goal runs have been accomplished in the Hamsterdam scenario. For similar goals (e.g.,
center an object in the sensor fan), similar performance can be obtained, which is unsurprising (though reas-
suring) considering the approximate correspondence of actions and sensor systems between the two scenar-
ios. The Hamsterdam scenario also offers the possibility of creating goals that depend on dynamic aspects of
the environment (for instance, learning to chase a moving object), however, work on such more-sophisti-
cated goals is still preliminary.
Algorithm Learning Work required Facts per work unit
Spinoff selectors Statistic selectors Schemas Inner loops (x10 6) Reliable schemas over
Items Schemas Items Schema Total Rel T/R Spin Stat Both Spin Stats Both
AIN
AIN
AIN
CIN
CIN
CIN
CIN
CIN
CIN
CIN
CIN
CIN
CIN
ASN
ASN
ASN
ASN
SWRUS
ABSPSDUCI
ASN
ABSPSDUCI
ABSPSDUCI
ASN
SWRUS
SWRUS
ABSPSDUCI
VTM AwnUS
AIN
CINIH
AIN
AIN
AIN
AIN
AIN
AIN
CINIH
CINIH
AIN
CINIH
CINIH
ASN
ABSPSDUCI
ABSPSDUCI
ASN
ASN
ASN
ABSPSDUCI
ABSPSDUCI
ASN
ABSPSDUCI
ABSPSDUCI
ASN
ABSPSDUCI
1756
1135
1110
1693
1395
1622
1110
1110
1366
1136
1102
1353
1136
CTNTH AMgPRDUT 11134
993
403
518
948
791
924
506
506
643
399
498
688
399
1.77
2.82
2.14
1.79
1.76
1.76
2.19
2.19
2.12
2.85
2.21
1.97
2.85
398 2.85
533
398
391
44
2
15
33
10
13
34
1
2
10
533
12
55
524
463
510
54
54
64
12
53
64
12
1066
410
446
568
466
525
87
64
77
46
54
66
22
12 13
1.9
1.0
1.3
21.5
316.4
61.6
15.3
50.6
49.5
11.7
415.0
275.2
40.7
1.9
33.6
9.4
1.8
1.7
1.8
9.4
9.4
10.0
33.3
9.4
10.8
33.3
0.9
1.0
1.2
1.7
1.7
1.8
5.8
7.9
8.4
8.7
9.2
10.3
18.3
331.7 33.2 30.2
Figure 10: Goal-dependent learning and its effect on the work required
This table is a recap of Figure 8, on page 55, with additional results for a typical goal run (in this case, the goal
demonstrated in Figure 9, on page 69). The new results are in the box at the bottom. Goal-independent selectors and
the goal mechanism are run simultaneously.
The first, lightly shaded line shows a run with the given selectors and the goal of Figure 9, in which the occa-
sional randomness in permitted actions described in Section 4.3.1.1, on page 64 is disabled (in other words, the per-
mitted actions are always completely determined by the specification of the active goals).
The remaining pair of more heavily-shaded lines show results in which occasional randomness in permitted
actions is enabled (the normal case). The top line of the pair is exactly the same run as that shown by the lightly-
shaded line above it. The bottom line of the pair shows the "best" strategy from Chapter 3 (on the bottommost line
of that table, and immediately above the box in this one) combined with the goalfrom Figure 9.
A less obvious effect concerns the coverage of that part of the world that is deemed
important by the goal (in other words, how thoroughly the generated schemas make predic-
tions about all the possible states of the world and the effects of the agent's actions in those
states). Consider conjunctions, which are used whenever a schema's context or result must
talk about more than one item, and synthetic items, which are used to provide the basis for
the mechanism used to learn concepts such as object persistence [Drescher 91].
The table below compares the number of generated conjunctions and synthetic items
Algorithm Goal Learning
Spinoff selectors Statistic selectors Schemas Items
Items Schemas Items Schema Total Rel Conj Syn
AIN ASN AIN ASN none 3244 1856 184 10
CIN SWRUS CINIH ABSPSDUCI none 3213 1299 112 13
CIN SWRUS CINIH ABSPSDUCI High Res Scan 3209 1317 994 119
Figure 11: The effect of goals on selected schema characteristics
generated in goal-independent and goal-dependent learning. First, two goal-independent
runs, which were created using different selectors, are compared. It is clear that using a
more-focused algorithm tends to decrease the number of conjunctions learned, though only
by a small amount. However, adding goal-dependent learning dramatically increases the
number of conjunctive contexts and results in the generated schemas, by a factor of 5.4
over the least-focused algorithm (in which we are comparing apples and oranges, really-
we are comparing unfocused, goal-independent learning with focused, goal-dependent
learning), and by a factor of 8.9 when the selection algorithm is held constant. (In other
words, if we compare two runs which were both generated with the same type of goal-inde-
pendent filtering-as shown by the bottom two lines of the table-and then use goal-
dependent learning in one of those runs, the number of conjunctions in the run that used
goal-dependent learning is vastly increased.) These figures are for a particular number of
generated schemas, of course: these ratios will change as the length of the run changes. In
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general the number of generated schemas, conjunctions, and synthetic items all follow an
n2-shaped curve as the number of iterations increases, starting off slowly and then growing
more and more quickly.
Similarly, the number of synthetic items generated has also increased enormously, by
about an order of magnitude.
What can be causing these changes? It appears that, by restricting the learning to sche-
mas making predictions about only some aspects of the given microworld, we are decreas-
ing the breadth of learning, while increasing its depth. Certain things are learned much
more slowly (e.g., in this case, the effects of hand motions), but those things which are
learned (e.g., the effects of eye motions) are learned in much greater detail. 10
To demonstrate the above claim about increased depth, let us examine the average car-
dinality of the generated schemas. (Cardinality was defined in Section 4.3.2.4.2, on
page 75, in the discussion of path metrics. It is equal to the number of items appearing in
the context and result of a particular schema.) If conjunctions are more common, the aver-
age cardinality is higher, since each schema mentions more items on average.
The table below shows that, for roughly comparable numbers of generated schemas,
Algorithm Goal Learning
Spinoff selectors Statistic selectors Schemas Ave Cardinality
Items Schemas Items Schema Total Ctxt Res Both
AIN ASN AIN ASN none 3599 0.99 1.15 2.14
CIN SWRUS CINIH ABSPSDUCI High Res Scan 3366 1.72 1.32 3.04
Figure 12: Average schema cardinalities with and without goals
the average cardinality of schemas has increased substantially-each schema, on average,
10. If one had the time to run a much larger number of iterations, as Drescher has done on various types of
Connection Machines, one might see these large numbers of conjunctions and synthetic items even if no
focus is being employed, since the entire microworld will be very thoroughly covered if enough schemas are
generated. Indeed, this is exactly the case, as reported for long runs on parallel machines, producing tens of
thousands of schemas, in which conjunctions and synthetic items dominate the results [Drescher 93].
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makes a prediction about more of the world."1 The first line shows a run that uses the orig-
inal, unfocused learning algorithm-which tends to generate more conjunctions than any
of the more-focused algorithms-when running in a goal-independent fashion. The second
line shows the most tightly-focused algorithm-which would normally generate many
fewer conjunctions than the unfocused algorithm, if it were running goal-independently-
in which the algorithm is being run with goal-dependent learning. Even with the odds
stacked against the tightly-focused run on the second line, the addition of goal-dependent
learning clearly shows that the average cardinality has increased.
4.4.3 Competence
As examined in Section 4.3.2, on page 71, simple comparisons of the numbers of sche-
mas generated is not necessarily sufficient when reasoning about the effects of learning
with goals. In this section, we use the terminology and methods of that section to evaluate
what the schema system has learned when operating in a goal-directed fashion. To keep the
length of the presentation reasonable, we shall again use the goal shown in Figure 9, on
page 69, as our exemplar. 12
11. There are two possible confounding influences in this chart, but both are relatively minor. First, we are
making a comparison with different selectors. However, Figure 11, on page 89, demonstrates (as do other
results not shown here) that using a focused, goal-independent run, instead of the unfocused one used here,
would tend to generate somewhat fewer conjunctions for a given number of schemas, hence resulting in
lower average cardinalities-which would only increase the contrast seen between the goal-independent and
goal-dependent results presented. Second, we are assuming, when we say that "the goal-dependent schemas
are predicting more about the world," that the average reliabilities of schemas in each set is comparable.This
is in fact the case.
12. Incidentally, several other goal sets have been specified and run, although many of them are less inter-
esting than the one used repeatedly here. For example, a goal set which attempts only to get any object into
any foveal region was tried early on-but its performance is uninteresting, because almost any eye motion
will tend to get an object into some portion of the visual field, in either scenario, because of the relatively
larger percentage of the eye occupied by the fovea. Other, more difficult goal sets showed similar properties
to those related here for object centering.
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In general, the learning was evaluated by generating a set of scorecards for any given
combination of parameters. Usually, the scorecard set is composed of simulation runs with
different lobotomy levels imposed, to examine how learning longer affects the results.
A few scorecard sets from the larger number 13 generated for various goal sets are
shown in Figure 13, on page 93, and Figure 14, on page 94.14 When examining these
scorecards, which report (among many other things) the average length of plans to reach
the end goal, it is reasonable to ask how long a path a random plan might be expected to
produce, in other words, the length of a random walk from a random point in the state space
to the goal state.
For the goal shown in these charts, the length of such a random plan is approximately
13.4 steps. This was determined by the simple expedient of taking a random action at every
timestep, and counting up the length of each plan from one encounter of the goal state to
the next, over several hundred thousand timesteps.
Figure 13 demonstrates the effects of grossly insufficient learning, caused by loboto-
mizing the knowledge base at a very small number of schemas. Until we get to somewhere
above 90 schemas in this case, there is no schema which actually includes the goal state in
its result. Before this point, planning cannot even begin, as no chain may be built from any
initial state to the goal state. The number of aimless steps taken while attempting to recover
from these planning failures is quite large; so is the number of times that the pursuit of the
13. On the order of a couple of dozen, for various goal sets, including scanning into anywhere in the fovea,
scanning into dead center, moving the hand until it contacted something, scanning to a particular spot on the
edge of the visual field (inspired by orientation to peripheral vision), and so forth.
14. N in these charts shows the number of attempts made to plan a path to the goal; we run any given score-
card either until 50 wins have occurred, or until we have tried 100 times to begin planning. Thus, if a large
number of events which prohibit even trying to plan occur in a run (for example, many instances of done-at-
start or stymied-short-circuit failures, in which we cannot even being planning until the world state has
changed somewhat), N will be substantially less than 100.
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goal is declared to be totally frustrated (because the simulation never manages to take
enough aimless steps that it lands in a state from which planning may proceed).
Even after we pass the point at which there are enough schemas that planning can com-
mence, the results are poor with this few schemas. There are few wins and many types of
planning failures, such as no-effect stymies. Almost every plan starts with a schema with a
null context (a desperation plan). The average winning path length is 1.00-because any
plan involving more than one step ends in failure due to insufficient knowledge about the
world, and hence is not counted in an average of winning path lengths. 15
Figure 14, on the other hand, compares two otherwise-similar runs with a much larger
number of schemas. One run allows incremental replanning (bottom table), and one does
not (top table). Allowing replanning while attempting to reach the goal demonstrates more
clearly that the schemas have learned what to do: the average path length to the goal is sig-
nificantly shorter when replanning is allowed, since incorrect predictions or changes in the
world can be compensated for en route. When the knowledge base has been extensively
lobotomized (e.g., below around 1300 schemas in this example), replanning tends to lose
its effectiveness, however. This can be seen by several factors, such as the high average
plan length, even for winning plans; the number of times an action has no effect; and the
number of times that a plan that starts with a contextless schema, indicating a desperation
move. In short, when very little is known about the domain, planning more frequently is of
no use.
As a final exercise, let us compare goal-independent with goal-dependent competence
directly, using as parameters the number of path wins, the number of "no effect" stymies,
15. Indeed, it is quite likely that almost all of those one-step plans were desperation plans, which also
explains their low reliability. If the plan just happened to start from a state that was one step away from the
goal (though it did not really "know" it, because its context was empty), then it might win. But if it was any
farther away, the lack of a context at its start dooms the plan to failure, because it essentially "looked before
it leaped."
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and the number of "no starting context" (desperation plans). Figure 15 below examines
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Limit
Figure 15: Goal-independent and goal-dependent performance compared
these variables. It shows the number of schemas in the knowledge base increasing towards
the right ("limit" shows the top schema number allowed in the range permitted under the
current lobotomy and is equal to the number of schemas). The vertical axis is a simple
count of the various types of planning scorecard entries for wins, no-effect stymies, and no-
context (desperation) plans, for both goal-dependent and goal independent learning.
In general, and as might be expected, planning successes for either method increase as
the number of schemas increases, and stymies and desperation plans decrease. (After all,
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all graphs of learning algorithms show this sort of trend, since learning systems that
become less competent as they learn more are generally considered uninteresting.)
The most peculiar thing about this graph is that goal-independent learning does so well.
One might imagine that, having learned less deeply but more broadly, goal-independent
planning would do less well than goal-dependent learning. 16 Instead, goal-independent
learning does better, at least for our example goal set. What could explain this surprisingly
good performance?
Part of the answer lies in the relative simplicity of the microworlds employed in either
scenario, and in the goals we use. There are only a small number of unique objects in either
microworld; this has interesting consequences. Consider the infant/eyehand scenario when
using goal-independent learning. At any given point in a run, even if relatively few sche-
mas mentioning coarse visual items have been generated (relative to all schemas which
have been generated) there are a large number of schemas dependent upon fine foveal
visual items, which make predictions about particular details seen in the fovea in response
to moving the eye.' 7 Since there are so few objects (e.g., four), the number of different con-
figurations of perceivable details is small; this means that fine foveal items can essentially
take the place of coarse visual items in predicting the result of eye motions.
16. Of course, all of this assumes that, if we are testing goal-dependent learning, the goals used in learning
have something to do with the goals used in evaluation. If we were to train the system by only running goals
involving eye motions, then evaluate the system by only running goals involving hand motions, we would
rightly expect very poor performance. Indeed, if the "occasional randomness" factor for permitted actions is
turned off, performance would be uniformly zero in this case.
17. In the infant/eyehand scenario, fine foveal items make up approximately half of all sensory items.
Coarse visual items make up another quarter or so. This means that the contribution of haptic, taste, etc,
inputs is small, so adding in schemas which also make predictions about those inputs (as the goal-indepen-
dent case does) tends not to "dilute" the general pool of schemas with non-visually-predictive schemas.
Hence, by being completely unselective, we do not materially affect the performance of visual goals in this
microworld-if and only if such goals involve the region in or near the fovea in some way.
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To be more specific, consider a plan such as vF42/EYER/VF32, VF32/EYER/VF22. The
end result of this plan is to activate item VF22, e.g., to land something dead-center in the
coarse visual field: such a plan should only be invoked if the agent started out with some
object at vF42. Suppose, however, that VF32/EYER/VF32 did not exist as a reliable schema
in the current knowledge base-this might well be the case, even in a large knowledge
base, in a goal-independent run (see also the discussion a few paragraphs below and
Figure 16, on page 100, for a real example of this).
A goal-independent run, though it was missing VF42/EYER/VF32, would be quite likely
to have some schemas such as VF42/EYER/FOVRO3 and FOVR03/EYER/VF32, for some
foveal detail in FOVR (in this case, it happened to be 03).18 In this case, we can nonetheless
form the plan vF42/EYER/FOVRO3, FOVR03/EYERIVF32, and we are quite likely (because
there are so many foveal sensory items-roughly half of all items) that there will be some
pair of schemas that can continue the chain in this fashion.
In essence, plans that would otherwise use coarse visual items may also use fine visual
items, with equivalent predictive power, because large "clumps" of fine foveal items
behave en masse, hopping as a group from one foveal region to another in the same way
that single coarse visual bits do under similar actions. 19
18. FOVR is the right foveal area; it covers exactly the same area as VF32.
19. Because so many foveal items hop "as a group" (there being only a very small number of distinct
clumps of details, given the small number of objects), highly-conjunctive schemas are also common. In the
goal-independent case, most of the conjunctions in schemas are conjuncts of multiple fine foveal items; in
the goal-dependent case, most of them are conjuncts of coarse visual items, arrived at with considerably
more experimentation due to their poorer correlations in the world. This means that, in the goal-independent
case, the large number of correlated foveal bits tend to cause the Case 4 path metric (Section 4.3.2.4.2, on
page 75) to preferentially use them as well. This large number of conjunctions means that we may find a
large number of paths such as, e.g., vF42/EYER/FOVRO1&FOVRO2&FOvRO3&FOVRO 4 , FOvR03/EYER/vF32,
since the second schema need only depend on one of the bits asserted by the first, and since any object that
causes one foveal bit to be asserted will tend to cause many others in that foveal area to be asserted simulta-
neously as well, leading to a large number of generated conjunctions.
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This outcome was unexpected. While goal-dependent learning clearly uses less compu-
tational work and still produces quite reasonable results, the ability of goal-independent
learning to "compensate" by using, in this case, fine foveal items, makes it difficult to see
the advantages of goal-dependence.
There are several ways of constructing better test cases for goal-dependent learning,
given the situation. Results from one such test case are illustrated in Figure 16, on
page 100.20 This pair of scorecards shows performance for the somewhat-peculiar task of
scanning an object into coarse visual field position 0,1-a point chosen completely at ran-
dom on the periphery of the visual field, in this case near the lower left corner. 21
Since there are no fine foveal inputs there, foveal schemas cannot help us. In this case,
it could be expected that goal-independent learning would do substantially worse than
goal-dependent learning. In fact, as Figure 16 demonstrates, goal-independent learning for
this randomly-chosen goal was a complete disaster-even with as many schemas as existed
in the entire goal-independent run, the knowledge base was apparently completely unable
to determine how to achieve the goal. 22
The reason for this is clear from the above discussion. Since the goal-independent case
allocates its learning effort more indiscriminately, it covers any particular part of the state
space less thoroughly. In this case, even after generating 3600 schemas, it never happened
20. Another solution, which received some experimental attention, but not enough to report here quantita-
tively, is to employ microworlds with larger "diameters" (e.g., in the infant/eyehand scenario, one might
expand the world from 7-by-7 to 20-by-20 or more) or, given a larger diameter universe to work in, a sen-
sory systems with similarly larger diameters (making the fovea cover proportionally less area in the eye).
Such changes would make longer paths more important for correct planning, which would tend to expose
even small weaknesses; the combination of a long path and a small fovea should make goal-independent
learning rather poor.
21. Such a task is akin to a human trying to see a very dim object by scanning it to the retinal periphery,
where the high-sensitivity rods reside.
22. It so happens that the particular goal-independent run used was one using the original (unfocused)
Drescher algorithm-so if any goal-independent run should have picked up the necessary schemas, this one
should have.
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to generate a schema whose result was vFO 1. This lead to a complete failure of the planning
system, as illustrated by the fact that a stymied-can't-start failure occurred for every
attempt to plan. The only other outcome of any attempt to reach the goal in this case was
the infrequent random occurrence of the goal already being true by chance when the sys-
tem was about to try planning a way there (the done-at-start values in the rightmost col-
umn).
On the other hand, the goal-directed case covered the state space much more densely.
Even with a third as many schemas as the goal-independent case, it was never unable to
generate a plan. As schemas are added to the knowledge base, the accuracy of the plans
apparently increases (note the increasing number of wins). There are still a fair number of
mis-steps and desperation plans, evidently caused by still-incomplete coverage of the state
space, but at least the goal-dependent case makes some progress. It would probably make
substantially better progress if it had been trained with the same goal-in fact, this run
shows the performance in trying to reach a goal (VF01 asserted) for which the system was
not even explicitly trained-its training consisted of the High Res Scan Into Dead-Center
goal, which has a different emphasis in the state space it attempts to investigate (but one
which is still more biased towards visual scanning behavior than a goal-independent strat-
egy).
One of the most important lessons from these results is that there is often very tight
coupling between the world, the sensory system, and the goals that might be employed. All
three interact quite strongly, and untangling that interaction can require persistence and
care.
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Chapter 5: Related Work
Work in selective attention can draw from two major fields for inspiration and guid-
ance. The first is work in machine learning, primarily that concerned with causal model
builders and active agents, and secondarily passive learners and the reinforcement learning
literature in general.
The second is the study of attentional processes in the cognitive science literature.
There has been considerable work on attention in cognitive science, and the questions
asked and insights gained into attentional processes, while themselves often insufficiently
well-specified to serve as computational theories, may serve as inspiration for approaches
to machine implementation.
5.1 Related Work in Machine Learning
5.1.1 Introduction
As illustrated earlier, a typical agent in the world cannot perceive every part of the
world at once, nor should it--even "perceiving" without "learning" is expensive if the
agent must perceive everything. However, not perceiving the whole world at once can lead
to a phenomenon that [Whitehead and Ballard 90] calls perceptual aliasing, in which dif-
ferent world states can appear identical to the agent, and which causes most reinforcement
learning mechanisms to perform poorly or not at all. Both they and [Woodfill and
Zabih 90] propose systems which combine selective visual attention (which is used to
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"ignore" certain parts of the world at certain times) with special algorithms to attempt to
overcome the aliasing problem.
Many of the methods described in earlier chapters may be available to other machine
learning systems, and several such extensions are discussed in later sections. While
Drescher's schema system keeps exhaustive statistics and is thus easy to adapt in the man-
ner shown, any agent that tries to correlate its actions with results must keep around some
sort of statistics regarding those results from which to learn, even if they are only available
for the instant of perception, and those stored statistics are candidates for pruning. Further,
any such agent must somehow perceive the world, and its sensory inputs are likewise can-
didates for pruning.
For example, the techniques used in the most-focused of the goal-independent strate-
gies shown in Chapter 3 (bottom line of Figure 8, on page 55) are likely to be available to
most learning systems operating in a discrete microworld. They require being able to keep
track of which sensory items have changed recently, and which facts depend upon (e.g.,
make predictions concerning) those items. This does not seem an insurmountable obstacle
for many algorithms. It is even possible that particular algorithms which do not possess
absolute knowledge about, for example, which sensory items are mentioned in any given
learned fact (such as the hidden nodes of a neural net) might nonetheless be able to yield a
probabilistic estimate of how likely it is that some particular part of the internal knowledge
base might depend on a particular sensory input. If so, such algorithms might also allow
cognitive pruning to take place.
Selective attention and goal-directed learning have recently been getting considerably
more attention in the literature than previously. Several researchers have advanced frame-
works or architectures for thinking about and taxonomizing such systems, usually based
either upon a model offiltering or discarding information deemed unnecessary or harmful
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for the learner [Markovitch and Scott 93], or upon explicitly modelling goals, using goals
both to inform the learning process and as input to metareasoning strategies which reason
about the performance of the learner [Ram and Leake 94].
The next few sections will discuss some of these issues. Section 5.1.2, examines the
selective attention side of the issue, and Section 5.1.3, on page 108, addresses goal-
directed learning aspects.
5.1.2 Selective attention as filtering
[Markovitch and Scott 93] propose an information filtering framework for evaluating
and specifying selection mechanisms in machine learning systems. As shown in Figure 17,
Selective
Retention
Selective Selective Selective Selective Problems
Experience Attention Acquisition UtilizationI
Experience Attention Acquisition Knowledge problem
SpaceProcedure Procedure Baesolver
Solutions
Figure 17: Markovitch and Scott's information-flow filtering model
they propose five different places in which filtering may be employed as a selectional
mechanism:
- Selective experience reduces the acquisition of knowledge when the num-
ber of possible training experiences is large.
- Selective attention reduces the acquisition of knowledge when individual
training experiences are complex.
- Selective acquisition reduces knowledge that has been acquired from some
training example(s) from reaching the permanent knowledge base, but can
be somewhat limited by not knowing how the knowledge might be used.
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- Selective retention allows "forgetting" knowledge that will not be worth its
storage cost (or is actively harmful), for any later problem.
- Selective utilization allows "ignoring" parts of the knowledge base that will
not be useful for solving the current problem.
Using this framework, they summarized several well-known machine learning sys-
tems. Figure 18, on page 106, is from [Markovitch and Scott 93], amended to include the
current research. According to their framework, the work described in previous chapters
employs selective attention (in the form of how sensory information is accepted, e.g., sen-
sory pruning) and selective utilization (in the form of which schemas are updated or spun
off from, e.g., cognitive pruning). Selective utilization, as is used here, is not often used in
current machine learning systems; 1B4 [Aha and Kibler 91] and EGGS [Mooney 89], both
relatively recent systems, make use of it, but few others. 1
[Kaelbling and Chapman 90] propose a technique (the G algorithm) for using statistical
measures to recursively subdivide the world known by an agent into finer and finer pieces,
as needed, making particular types of otherwise intractable unsupervised learning algo-
rithms more tractable. One could view that as an example of perceptual selectivity: the
agent gradually increases the set of state variables that are considered, as needed, when
selecting actions and learning (updating statistics).
Along these lines, [Moore and Atkeson 93] propose a technique called prioritized
sweeping. This approach concentrates learning effort in those regions of the world that are
likely to be least well-understood, creating a tree of which questions should be answered
and in what order, and shows promise in substantially decreasing the computational com-
1. In IB4, which functions similarly to memory-based reasoning [Stanfill and Waltz 86], instances which
perform poorly are simply discarded from the database (selective retention), and newly-acquired instances
are prevented from contributing to decisions until sufficient evidence has accumulated to demonstrate that
they are reliable (selective utilization). In EGGS, an explanation-based learner, the system only uses learned
rules that completely solve a problem, and no use is made of learned knowledge to prove subgoals.
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[System Filter Description Evaluation Metric
Checker Player [Samuel 59]
Genetic algorithms
[Holland 86]
MetaDENDRAL [Bucha-
nan and Feigenbaum 82]
Version Space [Mitchell 82]
ID3 [Quinlan 86]
INDUCE [Dietterich and
Michalski 81]
LEX [Mitchell, Utgoff, and
Banerji 83]
Retention Discards least useful board
position
Retention Randomly retains elements
with probability proportional
to their fitness
Acquisition Attempts to find smallest set of
rules that accounts for data
Experience Chooses experience that will
reduce version space by great-
est amount
Experience Selects only misclassified
instances
Acquisition Eliminates candidate generali-
zations using several evalua-
tion criteria
Experience The Problem Generator con-
structs new practice problems
Attention The Critic marks positive and
negative instances in the
search area
Frequency of use
Fitness defined in a domain-spe-
cific manner
Rules that correctly predict
peaks not predicted by other
rules score higher
Selects experience that comes
closest to matching half remain-
ing hypotheses
Correctness of classification
Includes coverage, specificity,
and user defined function
Prefer problems that will refine
partially learned heuristics
Select search steps on the lowest
cost solutions as positive
MetaLEX [Keller 87]
DIDO [Scott and
Markovitch 89]
PRODIGY [Minton 88]
Retention Removes subexpressions that A weighted combination of esti-
are estimated to be harmful mated cost and estimated benefit
Experience Performs experiments on
classes with high uncertainty
Experience Generates experiments when
discovers incomplete domain
knowledge
Attention The OBSERVER selects train-
ing examples out of the trace
tree
Acquisition Estimates utility of newly
acquired control rules and
deletes those unlikely to be
useful
Retention Empirical utility validation by
keeping the running total of
the costs and frequency of
application
Prefer experiences involving
objects of classes with higher
uncertainties
Incompleteness
Training example selection heu-
ristics eliminate "uninteresting"
examples
Eliminate rules whose cost
would outweigh saving, even if
always applicable
Estimated accumulated savings
minus accumulated match cost;
if negative, discard rule
Figure 18: Selection mechanisms in some existing learning systems (Sheet 1 of 2)
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MACLEARN [Iba 89]
FUNES [Markovitch and
Scott 88]
CLASSIT-2 [Gennari 89]
Hypothesis Filtering
[Etzioni 88]
1B4 [Aha and Kibler 91]
Attention The macro proposer uses
peak-to-peak heuristics
Acquisition Static filtering; only macros
estimated to be useful are
acquired
Retention Dynamic filtering; invoked
manually
Retention Various heuristics to decide
what macros to delete
Attention Attributes with low salience
are ignored
Retention Runs a test on sample popula-
tion; passes only hypotheses
which are PAC
Acquistion Acquires misclassified
instances
Propose only macros that are
between two peaks of the heuris-
tic function
Redundancy test (primitive) and
limit on length and domain spe-
cific test
Frequency of use in solution
Random, Frequency of use x
Length
Salience
For a given E and 6, compute an
upper bound on the distance
between the hypothesis and the
target concept
Correctness of classification
Retention Removes instances that appear Confidence interval of propor-
to be noisy tions test
Utilization Only instances that have
proved reliable are used for
classification
Utilization Learned macros are used only
if they solve the problem
Attention Sensory bits not relevant to
typical world behavior or cur-
rent goals are not perceived
Utilization Schemas which do not make
predictions concerning cur-
rently useful sensory bits,
actions, or goals, are not
updated or spun off
Confidence interval of propor-
tions test
Macros that do not solve the
problem are worth nothing
Spatial and temporal proximity
(goal-independent); relevance to
current goal (goal-dependent)
Spatial and temporal proximity
(goal-independent); relevance to
current goal (goal-dependent)
Figure 18: Selection mechanisms in some existing learning systems (Sheet 2 of 2)
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EGGS [Mooney 89]
This research [Foner 94]
plexity of many common learning situations. They demonstrate it in system that learns a
world model in a world of stochastic Markov chains; it is somewhat similar to DYNA
[Sutton 90] .
As another way to look at the problem, consider classifier systems, such as in
[Holland 86]. Classifier systems have a built-in mechanism for generalizing over situations
as well as actions and thereby perform some form of selective attention. In particular, a
classifier may include multiple "don't care" symbols which will match several specific
sensor data vectors and actions. This makes it possible for classifier systems to sample
parts of the state space at different levels of abstraction and as such to find the most abstract
representation (or the set of items which are relevant) of a classifier that is useful for a par-
ticular problem the agent has. [Wilson 85] argues that the classifier system does indeed
tend to evolve more general classifiers which "neglect" whatever inputs are irrelevant.
Others have also addressed the problem of finding the proper tradeoff between effi-
ciency (the number of measurements a robot must take, for example) and accuracy (num-
ber of prediction errors) when attempting to build a world model. For example, [Tan 93]
proposes a unified framework for learning from examples, based on four distinct spaces in
concept learning: example space, feature space, concept space, and concept description
space. This framework is applied to analyzing CS-ID3 and CS-IBL in detail, which are
learning-cost-sensitive (hence "CS-") algorithms which can trade off accuracy for effi-
ciency in decision-tree-based (CS-ID3) or instance-based (CS-IBL) learning.
5.1.3 Selective attention as goal-driven learning
There has been considerable work in goal-driven learning in recent years. For example,
Ram, Leake, Cox, and Hunter have between them produced on the order of thirty papers
quite recently which all bear in some way or another on this topic. Some of them are dis-
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cussed below; other relevant papers include [Ram 90a], [Ram and Cox 90], [Cox and
Ram 94], [Ram 90b], and [Cox and Ram 92].
For example, [Leake and Ram 93] describe aspects of goal-directed learning from the
perspectives of Al, psychology, and education in a survey paper that reported on a work-
shop involving participants from all three areas. They summarized four taxonomies of
learning goals: by overarching tasks, by knowledge gap or failure-necessitated learning, by
the learning results, and by the learning activity. They also talk briefly about how goals for
learning arise, how they affect the learning process, how different types of learning goals
relate to each other, and how they are represented.
[Ram and Leake 94] propose a general framework for describing goal-driven learning
systems. This survey paper discusses how goals guide task performance, task learning, and
knowledge storage, with a strong emphasis on using plans to manage the growth of com-
plexity in all these areas. They propose a two-step framework for managing the learning,
in which the first step attempts to reach some particular goal, maintaining a trace of the rea-
soning performed. Plan failures or deficiencies during this reasoning are then used in the
second step, which uses credit/blame assignment to find the source of the failure. Thus,
learning in the second step is guided by a knowledge of what must be learned and why,
stemming from the information resulting from analysis of plan failures. Such explicit rea-
soning about goals is also discussed in [Ram and Hunter 92].
In addition, they point out the importance of multistrategy learning. Large, compli-
cated learning systems that operate on real-world problems are increasingly being imple-
mented as multistrategy learners. Such a technique allows using the appropriate learning
strategy for the particular piece of the problem which is currently of interest, but are often
hard to control or program without some automated way of determining when to use par-
ticular algorithms. Learning systems that can reason about their goals and use this informa-
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tion to select particular learning modules can make multistrategy learning more feasible. In
addition, they increase the feasibility of systems that can actively seek out additional
sources of information, rather than having to be spoon-fed information from a small num-
ber of hand-picked sources. For example, reasoning involving multistrategy learning is
employed by [Ram, Narayanan, and Cox 93] in a system that learns to troubleshoot and is
based on observations and a model of human operators engaged in a real-world trouble-
shooting task.
In recent work, [Hunter 94] provides two examples of these strategies in action. Both
are drawn from the domain of biology, which is becoming increasingly important as a
source of real-world applications of machine learning due to the large number of interest-
ing datasets, the possibility of external verification and grounding of results via physical
experiments, and the discipline imposed by having to cope with very large and scaled-up
systems from the start. Molecular biology is also increasingly in need of advanced compu-
tational tools to accomplish knowledge discovery.
The first of these examples concerns situations in which there is too little data for many
learning systems to operate effectively. Hunter's example in this case concerns determin-
ing the causes of lethality in osteogenesis imperfecta, a sometimes-fatal bone disorder
involving point mutations in the amino-acid coding sequences for collagen. The dimen-
sionality of the space is vast (approximately 243-dimensional), yet only approximately 70
relevant sequences have been determined from sufferers of the disease. With such a small
dataset, conventional clustering techniques are useless. However, systems such as RELIEF
[Kira and Rendall 92], a Focus/Induce/Extract system, can attempt to eliminate irrelevant
features in the dataset using statistical tests. (The system described uses C4.5 [Quinlan 86]
to extract condition/action rules from the resulting decision trees; see also [Dietterich 89]
and [desJardins 92] for related work.)
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The system described by Hunter has successfully discovered previously-unknown
information about this disease. It has a large collection of machine-learning algorithms in
it, and determines which of them to use for the part of the problem at hand by consulting
lists of preconditions and applicability conditions: a tool's preconditions must be com-
pletely satisfied for it to be eligible, whereas a tool's applicability conditions are used to
help determine which of the eligible tools to use (in general, the cheapest, fastest such tool
is chosen).
The second example concerns situations for which there is too much data, such as in
megaclustering of protein sequences. The current database set being produced by biolo-
gists consists of approximately 100,000 sequences, comprised of 20 million amino acids,
and doubles about every 18 months. Hunter's system actively determines, based on the cur-
rent subgoals, which of multiple data sources to contact over the network, how to commu-
nicate with the variety of different databases, what sort of analytical tools should be used
to analyze the data, which platform(s) to use to do so (since some tools require very large
machines, whereas others do not), and so forth.
This system, too, has discovered new scientific results,2 which is a strong claim of the
utility of the reasoning techniques employed. 3
In both of these examples, and in the goal-directed learning literature in general, the
problem of learning has been transformed from a search problem to a planning problem. A
naive approach is quite likely to result in simply turning one intractable problem into
another, so this transformation should not devolve into first-principle planning, but should
instead yield what Hunter calls a discovery strategy, or skeletal plans for learning, an espe-
2. Resulting in publications in the biological literature of its discoveries.
3. Hunter also makes the point that such a multistrategy approach is similar in spirit to the multiple-com-
petence-modules model proposed in the Society of Mind [Minsky 86]; this point is taken up again in the
next section.
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cially important feature in learning systems that must query databases-since otherwise
the expected outcome of any plan is sufficiently unpredictable that almost all plans of non-
trivial length will fail.
Such transformations show great promise in making machine learning in large, real-
world problems both tractable and useful in true knowledge discovery applications.
5.2 Related Work in Cognitive Science
5.2.1 Introduction
The cognitive science literature about attentional processes is vast. This overview will
examine some of the high points of that literature that seem most salient and that seem to
be of most utility in producing ideas about implementations of focus of attention in a
machine learning system.
One of the most interesting things about the literature of the last two or three decades
is that many of the same questions have been asked for all that time. It is slowly becoming
apparent that, in some cases, the questions themselves are likely to be misguided; in others,
while it has become clear that certain mechanisms are not responsible for attention, it is
still unclear which mechanisms are.
The confusion exists on many levels, from what constitutes a reasonable theory (e.g.,
there is disagreement about whether it need be computational, in the sense of [Marr 82])
even to simple aspects of terminology (many have railed against the vague use of suppos-
edly well-defined terms, and, amusingly enough, [White 64] dedicates an entire and rather
delightfully readable book to philosophical definitions of terms such as "attention," "real-
izing," "noticing," and so forth).
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Many people have summarized important parts of this literature and the questions sur-
rounding it, with an eye towards computer modeling of the mechanism (one example
would be [Chapman 90]) or to debate and clarify certain of the confusions of the field (see,
for example, Allport's excellent retrospective [Allport 90]). The debates over whether the
questions even make sense are not particularly new; for example, many of the concepts and
ideas that [Kinchia 80] feels necessary to bury still have enough life in them that
[Allport 90] is still driving stakes through their hearts. [Van der Heijden 92] spends an
entire chapter of a book doing likewise, exploring and denigrating theories such as the
belief in [Broadbent 71] (for example) of central and limited capacity.
Such guides to the other literature have been very useful in determining how the field
has progressed, and in which directions to proceed in examining this enormous array of
work; in some of the discussion that follows, I am particularly indebted to the keen and
sometimes provocative thinking of Allport and Kinchia.
A large part of the problem with much of the literature on attention is due to its treat-
ment of "attention" as a single, unitary, central process, rather than as a variety of cognitive
mechanisms that mediate human information processing. [Kinchia 80] proposes several
illustrative theoretical processes, summarized as:
All-or-none attention model, and weighted integration model. These models
posit a sort of zero-sum information processing paradigm, in which any at-
tention devoted to one stimulus necessarily robs attention from an unattend-
ed stimulus. The former model assumes that this works like a switch-at-
tending to one stimulus essentially completely ignores another stimulus-
whereas the latter assumes a sort of linear transfer function between two
stimuli, where attention can be "shared" between them, albeit with lower
processing efficiency for each.
113
Chapter 5 Related Work
Chapter 5 Related Work
Serial coding models. Many influentual models of perception characterize
the initial internal representation of a stimulus as being held in a sensory
register, which is assumed fairly rich but unprocessed, and which must be
processed relatively quickly lest it decay while in temporary storage in this
register. Some view attention in this regard as a switch [Broadbent 58] or a
filter [Treisman 69] which determine what information was retrieved from
the register for further processing. [Rumelhart 70] characterizes this mech-
anism as a feature-extraction process, in which individual features are seri-
ally extracted and coded from this register.
Note that much of the debate about a single locus of attention seems rooted in more
fundamental conceptions of how the mind works, in areas unrelated to selective attention
per se. There is a long history of dealing with the mind as if it possessed a homunculus
somewhere, leading to theories whose explanatory powers are negligible. Dennett and
Kinsbourne, for example, feel this problem keenly [Dennett and Kinsbourne 92]. In report-
ing research results concerning the perception of subjective time, they spend considerable
effort first demolishing the Cartesian Theater model of the mind, in which the mind is pre-
sumed to have some place where "it all comes together." Their research instead supports
what they call the Multiple Drafts model, in which discriminations in multiple modalities
are not registered and synchronized before "presentation" to "consciousness," but instead
are distributed in both space and time in the brain. The arguments that they present in
demolishing the Cartesian Theater model are of the same sort required to demolish the
"single, serial" model of attentional processes, as delineated below.
Two of the major aspects of the problem concern arguments over early versus late
attention (e.g., whether attentional selection occurs before or after stimuli are coded into
categories), and which cognitive processes require attention, and are hence limited by
attention, and which do not. The major thrust of these arguments is to determine possible
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constraints in the processing architecture of the brain, so as to determine the overall and
detailed architecture of how the brain processes information. Unfortunately, many of these
architectural models are imperfect at best, and are surprisingly unhelpful in generating use-
ful architectures with sufficient explanatory power to permit either further analysis of the
system, or its reproduction (e.g., as a program).
The vast majority of studies of attention concentrate on visual attention. Of those, many
are detailed neuroanatomical studies of either humans or other primates (often via lesion
studies or examination of pathological cases). Others are performance tests of healthy
human volunteers. A small percentage deal with auditory attention, with an almost insig-
nificant percentage examining other forms of attention. This means that examples of atten-
tion are heavily biased towards human (or at least primate) visual attention only.
Such studies of attention are examining a system (namely, human cognition) which is
far more complicated than those yet investigated in machine learning. Consequently, while
they serve as interesting inspirations for approaches to try, it is not claimed that the
research in this thesis either explains anything about mammalian visual attention, or that
such studies necessarily will lead to a direct implementation.
5.2.2 The plausibility of attention as a system of limitations
There is a very widespread view that the need for selective attention stems from funda-
mental limitations in cognitive processing power in particular portions of the brain, and
that, if the brain were to have infinite computational power, such attentional limitations
would be unnecessary. This is argued over a span of decades by [Broadbent 58]
[Broadbent 71] [Broadbent 82], among many others. He and others view attention itself,
therefore, as a limited-capacity system, one which must be shared by many processing
stages and whose capabilities are therefore competed for by various portions of the brain.
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This view also espouses that some tasks are "automatic" and hence do not require
attention, presumbly by using portions of the brain whose capacity is not as severely lim-
ited [Kahneman 73]. The appeal of dividing cognition up in this rather intuitive fashion, of
course, is that, if one could identify the bottlenecks, one might begin to get a handle on how
cognition is structured.
Allport [Allport 90] describes Treisman's feature-integration theory (FIT) [Treisman
and Gelade 80], [Treisman 88] as one of the best-known of the theories that equate atten-
tional mechanisms with intrinsic bottlenecks in processing. It includes careful character-
ization and theoretical arguments that, according to the theory, necessitate serial focusing
on each item to be perceived in turn in order to correctly perceive objects that must be dis-
tinguished by conjunctions of separable features. Yet, immediately after describing Treis-
man's (and others') theories of attention, Allport (quite rightly) takes issue with much of
the terminology of the field; even what is meant by the word selection is ambiguous: Does
it mean "any task-dependent modulation of sensory neuronal responses?" "Selective facil-
itation?" "Attentional tagging?" "Selective feature integration?" "Entry to a limited-capac-
ity short-term memory store?"
The term attention has similar problems in cognitive science: [Johnston and Dark 86]
ask whether attention is some hypothetical causal agency which can be directed or focused
on an entity (with the result that this entity may be "selected"), or an outcome, characteriz-
ing the behavior of the whole organism. They point out that most current attentional theo-
ries postulate the above hypothetical causal agency, but that there is a great deal of drift
between the two concepts; they also mention that, in most contemporary theories, this
causal agency "has all the characteristics of a processing homunculus," which does not
help us to understand the underlying mechanisms.
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Many of the assumptions about cognitive architecture adopted by models of attention
appear in the following list, adapted from [Allport 90]:
- Information processing follows a linearly ordered, unidirectional sequence
of processing stages from sensory input to overt response. Parallel or recip-
rocal processing is disallowed in this model.
- Such a sequence is already known, or can be assumed a priori.
- The processing of nonsemantic attributes occurs before processing of se-
mantic attributes.
- Spatial attribute and relation processing logically precedes categorical or
semantic distinctions. There is just one locus of attentional selection, hence
it can be early or late, but not both.
- Attentional selection therefore serves as a gate for any further processing to
be performed; whatever does not make it past this gate will be remain un-
processed.
- There exists a single "central system" of limited capacity, responsible for all
cognitive processes that "require attention," which can only be bypassed for
"automatic" processes (defined, of course, as those which do not "require
attention").
I will detail below only a few of the ways in which, as mentioned in the introduction to
this section, this set of assumptions has begun to fall apart. But as an overall trend, there is
growing pressure to develop a theory of attentional selectivity and control, rather than the
current conception of attention as being a passive informationfilter.
Let us start at the top. If processing is inherently serial, why does the brain seem to have
separate processing for "what" versus "where" information? Consider the primate visual
system, composed of at least twenty different modules [Desimone and Ungerleider 89]
[Ullman 91]. These modules can be broadly grouped into the ventral system, crucial for
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form-based object recognition, and the dorsal system, responsible for spatial vision and
coordination [DeYoe and Van Essen 88] [Ungerleider and Mishkin 82]. This "what" ver-
sus "where" system is quite well established in the literature of visual attention, and poses
a rather embarrassing problem for the "single, serial" assumption above. (Indeed, [Felle-
man and Van Essen 91], to pick only one of many similar papers, demonstrate that among
32 areas that are associated with visual processing in the primate visual cortex, approxi-
mately 40% of all possible connection pathways between the modules actually exist! This
makes cortical visual processing organization look more like a bush than a hierarchical or
serial system, and does not even include the straightforward reciprocal neural connections
in each cortical area; see the discussion immediately below.)
Worse yet, almost everywhere in the cortex, the "forward," afferent connections that
one would expect (leading from the retina toward higher centers of processing) are paral-
leled by equally rich, "backward," or efferent connections [Ullman 91]. If all processing
proceeds in the afferent direction, what are all of those reciprocal connections doing there?
Many have proposed ideas: for example, [Mumford 91] proposes that each cortical area is
responsible for updating and maintaining knowledge of a specific aspect of the world, at
any given level from low level raw data to high level abstract representations, and that the
multiple, often conflicting hypotheses which result are integrated by thalamic neurons and
then sent back into the cortex, making the thalamo-cortical loop a sort of "active black-
board" system and thereby explaining the density of reciprocal cortical connections.
Ullman [Ullman 91] has proposed a particularly interesting idea with his sequence-
seeking counterstreams model, in which he posits that the neocortex searches for mappings
between "source" and "target" representations, exploring both "top-down" and "bottom-
up" a large number of alternative sequences in parallel. 4 Finally, even though most dia-
grams of the visual cortex show each module interacting with a few nearby ones in a semi-
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well-behaved processing mesh, almost every module also has a direct connection (e.g., an
output pathway) to some motor or action system, forming a number of direct, parallel links
between sensory and motor systems that could potentially bypass all levels of higher pro-
cessing [Creutzfeldt 85]. What are those links doing there, if the "single, serial" model is
correct?
It has also been argued by many that tasks conforming to what [Kahneman and
Treisman 84] call the "filtering paradigm," in which the to-be-selected visual items are
cued by nonspatial visual attributes such as color or size, may instead depend on selective
cueing by location [Butler and Currie 86, Johnston and Pashler 90], and that where this
spatial separation is absent, performance drops [Johnston and Dark 86]. This tends to
imply that many "early selection" paradigms of visual attention may instead correspond to
spatial selection.
But the picture is murky even in spatial selection. For one thing, extensive experimen-
tal evidence reveals many different coordinate systems and corresponding transformations
along the path from the retinotopic input through the cortex. For example, [Allport 90] pro-
vides a virtual laundry list of such transformations, mentioning some that take account of
eye and head position, some that code location in terms of arm- or body-centered coordi-
nates, and some based on environment- and perhaps object-centered coordinate systems; a
small sampling of work in this area can be found in [Andersen 87] [Andersen 89] [Ellis et
al 89] [Feldman 85] [Hinton and Parsons 88] [Marr 82] [Soechting, Tillery, and
4. Such counterstream architectures, if they exist in the brain at all, may no longer be unique to it, how-
ever. Bob Sproull of Sun Microsystems has proposed [Sproull 94] a novel, "counterflow pipeline" architec-
ture for advanced, pipelined RISC CPU's which shares many remarkable features with Ullman's
counterstreams model of processing. Instructions and results propagate in opposite directions in a processing
ladder, interacting with each other as they pass, and employ only local interaction (e.g., only within a ladder
level, or between two adjacent rungs of the ladder). Such a design also admits an asynchronously-clocked
implementation, making it more similar to possible cortical models such as Ullman's. However, the intersec-
tion between cognitive science and machine architecture is understandably not what it could be: neither Ull-
man nor Sproull had heard of the other's work.
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Flanders 90] [Zipser and Andersen 88]. This does not even include the many lesion studies
which investigate neglect in various coordinate systems after brain damage.
If recent results seem to put nails in the coffin of attention as a serial, feedforward,
strictly limitation-based strategy, what models are proposed instead? [Allport 90] argues
that the influence of attention in noncategorical, spatial-vision systems is of the form of
enhancement of neuronal responsiveness in attended locations, rather than attentuation of
unattended locations, and that many results involving delays in attending to stimuli reflect
the time cost of disengagement from the cued location, rather than withdrawal of process-
ing resources from the uncued location. (He also notes work, such as [Driver and
Tipper 89], which points out the problems with equating "no processing" and "no interfer-
ence.")
Indeed, lesion studies such as in dorsal simultanagnosia, in which the patient perceives
only one part of any given object even though his visual field is often full and complete,
seem to indicate that such damage leads to an inability to disengage from one part of the
visual field in order to shift attention to a different part of it: unilateral lesions
[Posner et al 87] [Morrow and Ratcliff 88] can lead to problems shifting attention to the
contralateral side, and full simultanagnosia can lead to problems shifting attention in any
direction [Luria et al 63].
Viewing attentional processes as a process involving commitment of resources, rather
than filtering, leads [Crick and Koch 90], for example, to suggest that attention facilitates
local competition among neurons: in other words, when a local group of neurons is not
attended to, it can have multiple (ambiguous) outputs, but attention then narrows down the
possible outputs, forcing disambiguation. This view of attention is quite different from that
of protecting the limited computational power of a single center from overload.
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This argument for a multiplicity of attentional mechanisms, each "specialists" in a par-
ticular cognitive area, fits in nicely with the Society of Mind hypothesis [Minsky 86].
While Minsky posits that many of the aspects of attention have to do with limits (e.g., lim-
itations in processing leading to the intuitively serial feeling of thought, or limitations in a
particular agent's ability leading to inability in tracking multiple locations simultaneously),
the theory does not say that there is a single limit anywhere-only that different agents will
likely contribute different limitations.
The existence of multiple loci of attentional control are reinforced dramatically by
[Mangun, Hillyard, and Luck 90], who use a combination of MRI brain images, behavioral
data, and event-related brain potential mapping. While this research comes down rather
strongly on the side of "early" selection (since the effects cited occur very quickly, within
150 msec), [Sperling, Wurst, and Lu 90] introduce a new theoretical construct, attentional
"tags," through which visual item traces may be selected from short-term memory, rather
than positing a single filter. Such an interpretation is completely in support of multiple loci
of attentional control.
It is interesting to note that the majority of even current work in the machine learning
community still treats attention as a single, serial pathway, and structures its systems
accordingly. (See, for example, Figure 17, on page 104, from [Markovitch and Scott 93],
and the discussion in Section 5.1, on page 102.)
One reason for this might be that current machine learning systems are still too primi-
tive to take advantage of architectures rich in reciprocal connections, or that contain multi-
ple loci of control or information processing. For example, the bulk of this thesis concerns
itself with single-agency pruning, of the type of "limitations and bottleneck" school so den-
igrated above. In addition, the sensory and cognitive system modelled in this research is
greatly simplified compared to even the most rudimentary levels of human cognition;
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many insects might have more sensory processing abilities, and even the simplest mammal
must be better at memory and generalization. 5
Just because the evidence for a single, serial control of attention no longer appears to
be compelling is no reason, of course, to discount much of the work that has been done in
attention. While it may not be the case that an explanation of one particular aspect of atten-
tion explains all of attention (either in that modality or others), there are many probably-
correct explanations of parts of the attention puzzle. Unfortunately, few have implemented
their theories, possibly because many of them are insufficiently precisely described for
such implementation. This makes it even more difficult to determine which theories might
be correct.
For example, [Chapman 90] cites several aspects of visual attention, such as results in
covert attention [Posner et al 80], and the winner-take-all addressing pyramid in [Koch and
Ullman 85] in support of visual spotlight search behavior. [Treisman and Gormican 88]
have done extensive research on visual pop-out behavior in visual search routines; for sur-
veys of visual search in general, see [Julesz 84] and [Treisman and Gelade 80]. But Koch
and Ullman did not implement their theory; in fact, Chapman's work is one of the few to
implement several subtheories of visual attention.
It may be, as machine learning systems become more sophisticated, employing multi-
ple processing strategies in a richly-connected information architecture, that they will be
better positioned to take advantage of current thinking about attention in cognitive science.
5. Although the lack of generalization in the schema system, as currently designed, does seem to put it on
a par with certain insects. For example, bees apparently remember places retinotopically-if they learn a
shape with one part of their eye, they can only recognize it again with that same part [Christensen 94]. Bees,
which have magnetite in their abdomens as part of their navigation system, face magnetic south (or magnetic
northwest in certain cases in which south is infeasible) when encountering and departing targets of interest.
By doing so, they can image the target in the same orientation; rather than rotating a mental representation of
the target, they simply rotate their real eyes instead until a match is acquired. Artificially imposed external
magnetic fields lead to predictable perturbances of this behavior.
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Organizations such as the subsumption architecture [Brooks 86], for example, or the Soci-
ety of Mind [Minsky 80] seem as if they will be logical computational testbeds for imple-
menting computational verification of multiple-loci attentional models.
Indeed, as shown by the some of the systems mentioned in Section 5.1.3, particularly
the multistrategy systems of Hunter, Ram, Cox, and others, the increasing complexity of
modern learning systems is forcing implementations of the control of their attentional
focus down just the sort of pathways that the multi-locus models of modem cognitive sci-
ence might lead one to expect.
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6.1 The effectiveness of focus of attention
The results described earlier in this thesis demonstrate that mechanisms for focusing
attention can greatly decrease the amount of work required by a learning system. Both
goal-independent and goal-dependent focus methods can be employed simultaneously,
decreasing the work of learning (and hence increasing its speed) by taking advantage both
of invariant characteristics of the world and of guidance provided by the set of goals that
the agent must achieve.
Because these methods can decrease the rate of growth of a fundamentally 0(n2) pro-
cess, their effects only increase as the size of the problem or the number of known facts
increases. This research showed combined improvements of over a factor of 50; longer
runs would have shown even more.
In addition, it was demonstrated both qualitatively and quantitatively that the correct-
ness and completeness of the learning performed in the systems studied was not impaired
by these techniques. One pays a price for them, namely having to perform more experi-
ments in the focused case to learn roughly comparable amounts of knowledge about the
world, but this price is quite small compared to the increase in efficiency that results. It is
possible that there are many other systems which can utilize similar techniques to achieve
faster learning without substantially sacrificing correctness or relative completeness.
As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, on page 49, and in Section 4.4.1, on page 86, the results
presented here are primarily from the infant/eyehand scenario. However, a smaller number
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of similar runs have been performed in the Hamsterdam scenario, with comparable results.
Given the approximate similarity of sensor systems and action repertoires in the two sce-
narios, this is unsurprising, but reassuring. The Hamsterdam scenario additionally offers
the potential for more interesting goal sets, due to the more dynamic world available-
there are many opportunities available there for more sophisticated experiments involving
goals and their control.
In short, using focus of attention is one of the many techniques that can and should be
employed to allow autonomous agents to learn more about their environment with less
computation. This can allow certain applications, which formerly ran too slowly to be prac-
tical, to be run at more reasonable speeds.
6.2 Future work
There are many ways in which this work might be improved or extended. A represen-
tative sampling of such ideas follows.
This is clearly far from an exhaustive list. Indeed, viewed in a larger context, the ques-
tions from [Maes 94] are still very much with us. Focus of attention cannot hope to address
all of those questions, but many of them might be partially answerable by using more
sophisticated focus mechanisms. This is an area deserving of future investigation.
6.2.1 Generalization and abstraction
One of the most frustrating aspects of the current schema system concerns its inability
to generalize in certain ways. The synthetic item machinery allows one form of generaliza-
tion, which is important for shifting to different levels of abstraction, but the implementa-
tion used in this research lacks composite actions, which severely limits the sort of
generalizations that might be made. Even with this machinery in place, simple generaliza-
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tion across a category of input would be very useful; 1 currently, the learning system
requires several examples at each point in the state space and therefore does not perform
this sort of generalization. This research has not addressed the details of what would be
required to function effectively in a learning system which employed such types of gener-
alization.
The focus system as currently implemented does not explicitly address different levels
of abstraction in the learning system. A system which created explicit categories at various
levels of abstraction would require some form of support for focus; how to do this well is
an open problem.
6.2.2 Filtering
In addition, the overall focus mechanism as implemented decides how tofilter its per-
ceptions, cognition, and actions based on characteristics of the domain and its current set
of goals, analogously to certain ideas about attention as a system of limitations that were
questioned in Chapter 5. It does not reason at a metalevel about the goals themselves,2 nor
does it use multiple concurrent learning mechanisms or multiple simultaneous processing
pathways. As such, there are large opportunities for further work using multistrategy learn-
ing and recent, non-filter-based, multi-locus ideas from cognitive science. Such work could
enable a more sophisticated action selection system.
1. An example would be automatically inferring that, if moving the eye right causes an object to appear to
slide left from one particular visual location to another (e.g., by turning off one visual item and turning on
the visual item to its left), then this would be true at all points in the retina. Such generalization would
require a retinotopic map (e.g., not the unordered "bag of bits" currently employed) so that concepts such as
"to the left of" could be inferred without exhaustively acquiring data about every adjacent pair of visual
items. Without such a map; there is no way of even determining adjacency without such exhaustive experi-
mentation. Such a retinotopic map is assumed in particular goals defined here (e.g., we assume that we know
a priori, due to hardwiring, which coarse visual items actually correspond to the fovea, in certain goals), but
this is not a general mechanism and cannot really be used by the schema system per se in order to increase
its representational power.
2. For example, to change their hardwired mapping from the goal to the allowed set of percepts and
actions.
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6.2.3 Experimental strategy
In addition to the above ideas about the action selection system, a more intelligent
experimentation strategy would be welcome. In particular, within the currently-allowed set
of actions specified by the active goals, actions are chosen randomly. This leads to explo-
ration of the state space in a manner which is probably quite inefficient. Consider the figure
below, from [Thrun 94]. In this figure, we have a robot which must simply navigate from
.0I | . .. 1
n states
Figure 19: A task which is 0(1) with counters, and 0(2") without
one end to the other, without learning. If the robot takes steps randomly either to the left or
to the right, its expected time to reach the goal is exponentially bad, e.g., 0(2"). If, on the
other hand, the robot is allowed a counter-based approach in which it simply drops a
counter on each visited square, and picks a square without such a counter when it can, its
performance improves to 0(1). Indeed, it has been proven that, subject to some simple and
common assumptions 3 any learning technique based on random walk is inefficient in time
[Whitehead 91a] [Whitehead 91b]. On the other hand, even a very simple strategy such as
''go to the least visited neighboring state" can reduce this inefficiency from exponential,
e.g,. 0(2") time to polynomial, e.g., 0(n2) time, regardless of whether or not one has a
model that can predict the next state from the current one [Thrun 92] [Thrun 94].4
3. These are: a state space which is finite, deterministic, and ergodic (e.g., no states from which, once
entered, the agent cannot escape), in which the agent receives a reward only in the goal state; there is no
information available about the domain a priori; random actions change the distance to the goal state by only
+1, 0, or -1, and can be expected to increase the distance to the goal on the average; and, finally, the size of
the state space is polynomial in the largest possible distance to the goal state, e.g., the depth of the state
space (this holds for most state spaces studied in literature, e.g., grids of arbitrary dimensionality).
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The system explored in this research does not quite meet Whitehead's conditions. In
particular, because of the stochastic characteristics of the domain microworlds studied, in
which other entities may move and hence change parts of the state space, and because of
the effects of sensor aliasing [Whitehead and Ballard 90], the system is nondeterministic.
Similar results do not exist for nondeterministic domains, and for some malicious domains,
it can be shown that any exploration technique will take exponential time to find a goal
state [Thrun 92].
Nonetheless, given domains which are not malicious, and which are not too stochastic,
it is quite possible that some sort of counter-based approach could increase the rate at
which relatively-unexplored parts of state space are encountered, hence decreasing the
amount of work per generated schema. One possible (but untried) approach would there-
fore be to use something akin to prioritized sweeping [Moore and Atkeson 93]. An even
simpler approach could be to always pick that action A for which the average reliability of
all currently-applicable 5 schemas containing action A is minimized.
6.2.4 Goals
The goal system implemented here is unsophisticated. It is unlikely to scale well to
large numbers of goals, in part because of its rather nonhierarchical space of goals, and in
part because goals and their relations to each other must currently be hardwired. It also
offers little support for multiple concurrent strategic (as opposed to tactical) goals, or for
sharing work between goals, nor do goals reason about their performance at a metalevel in
order to better guide the learning, as is done in some current multistrategy learners
[Hunter 94] [Ram and Leake 94]. A system which learned useful mappings from goals to
the correct strategy for focus of attention, rather than having such a strategy hardwired in
4. Such a predictive model does help, but the problem is still 0(n2).
5. E.g., context satisfied, meaning that their context agrees with the currently perceived state of the world.
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for each goal, would also be quite useful. It would extend the current work from the realm
of very simple animals further up the phylogenetic tree, and may help some of the probable
scaling issues in the current design.
6.2.5 Occasional defocusing
The focus system's selectively is a bit sharp; it is essentially an all-or-nothing sort of
focus. One that occasionally defocused might lead to more opportunistic exploration of the
space without undue cost; integrating this into the system in an intelligent way touches
upon many of the explore/exploit problems mentioned in [Maes 94].
129
ConclusionsChapter 6
Appendix A: System Architecture
Figure 20, on page 132, summarizes the architecture of the two testbeds built for this
research. In general, the learning system is connected "at arm's length" to the microworld.
The learning system can only send simple commands (one of a small number of actions) to
the microworld, and it only receives what sensor information the microworld transmits
back. It does not have access to internal microworld state.
The learning system is the same in either scenario. As shown in Figure 20, it contains
the schema system proper (which consists of, essentially, a reimplementation of Drescher's
schema system [Drescher 91] without certain elements),1 plus the goal-independent focus
mechanism described in Chapter 3 and the goal-dependent mechanism described in
Chapter 4. The action selection system picks actions at random in both the unfocused reim-
plementation of the original algorithm and in the goal-independent work described in
Chapter 3, but is informed by the goal system in the further work described in Chapter 4.
In addition, the learning system contains a large amount of diagnostic and performance-
monitoring code, from which the results (in terms of work per schema, etc) described in
this research were derived.
The microworld used in each scenario is, of course, different. In the case of the
infant/eyehand scenario, it runs in the same process as the learning system, though its only
connections to the learning system are via the aforementioned sets of actions and sensory
bits. In this case, the entire system was implemented as a single process in Lisp under Sym-
bolics Genera. 2 The microworld itself has no sophisticated rendering apparatus; instead,
1. Such as the composite-action system or the mechanism for computing delegated or instrumental value.
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simple character-based diagrams can be produced of its current state for inspection, evalu-
ation, and debugging.3
In the Hamsterdam scenario, however, the microworld is a separate process, imple-
mented as C and C++ code using SGI Inventor, and runs on a Silicon Graphics worksta-
tion. Hamsterdam includes sophisticated, real-time, three-dimensional graphic rendering.
It communicates with the learning system (in this case, implemented in Harlequin Lisp-
Works and running in a separate process, on either the same machine as Hamsterdam or a
different one) via a network connection consisting of a UNIX TCP socket.4 This proved to
be implementationally less than ideal, but of no interest theoretically, because the already-
enforced "arm's length" relationship between the learning system and any associated
microworld already decreases the possible coupling between the learning system and its
microworld to a very loose connection.
In both cases, the Lisp portion of the system (learning system and microworld in the
infant/eyehand scenario, or the learning system only5 in the Hamsterdam scenario) could
be snapshotted to disk and restored later using a component called the snapshotter. This
was an implementation convenience to make it easy to duplicate runs with different param-
2. Since the system is coded in Common Lisp, it could run under any Common Lisp implementation, how-
ever. It currently runs under Symbolics Genera and Harlequin LispWorks, and ports to other lisp implemen-
tations would be extremely straightforward.
3. A simple, colorful, graphical representation of this world was also constructed to demonstrate certain
aspects of the early system, but was essentially equivalent to the character-based diagrams in content.
4. Were LispWorks able to directly incorporate the code and libraries of Hamsterdam, the learning system
and Hamsterdam could run in a single process. However, because they were required to run in separate pro-
cesses due to limitations in currently-released versions of LispWorks, there is no reason why any learning
system, running on any other machine, could not be substituted for the current configuration.
5. The state of the Hamsterdam microworld cannot be so preserved in the same fashion, having never been
designed for it. Thus, strict reproducibility of runs in the Hamsterdam scenario is not possible, due to the dif-
fering environments that would be faced even by "identical" runs of the learning system. This makes the
Hamsterdam scenario slightly more difficult for debugging, since events would not always unfold identically
even if the same code were to be run.
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Figure 20: System architecture of both scenarios
In the infant (top) scenario, everything runs in a single process. The
only object under control of the learning system is the infant; the other
objects in the world occasionally move by themselves.
In the Hamsterdam (bottom) scenario, the learning system runs in
one process, and Hamsterdam runs in a separate process. The only
object under control of the learning system is the puppet; the hamsters
and predators are free to wander around autonomously, and do so con-
tinuously.
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eters, or to return to a long run after a reboot, given that the unmodified, unfocused system
could take up to 3-4 days to produce 3000 to 4000 schemas. 6
A communications signature of the interactions between the learning system and any
given microworld is summarized in Figure 21, on page 134. It is expressed in the typical
fashion for network protocols, as a Feynman diagram. In general, there is a lockstep rela-
tionship between an action being requested by the learning system, and the corresponding
sensory bits being returned by the microworld after the action has been performed. This
lockstep relationship, while perfectly reasonable in the infant/eyehand scenario, is less
realistic in a more dynamic microworld, such as that employed in the Hamsterdam sce-
nario.
Because of this difference in microworld characteristics, the communications protocol
employed for the Hamsterdam scenario was slightly modified. An explicit null action, not
present in the infant/eyehand scenario, was introduced. Like any other null action, it is able
to be part of a generated schema. Strictly speaking, such a null action could simply be mod-
elled as an action that never produces any detectable result, except for taking some amount
of time (and, indeed, this is exactly how it was implemented). However, it serves as a
placeholder in the schema system to model the result of not doing anything, which is itself
an important concept in a dynamic world.7
6. While the snapshotter's contribution was considerable early on in the course of this research, its utility
steadily decreased, because each successive refinement to the learning system, as described in later chapters,
served to increase the speed of the resulting system and thereby decrease both the real time and the compu-
tational work of producing equivalent states. In some cases, when using the most highly-selective learning,
runs of useful size could be produced in an hour or two-a considerable improvement.
7. Consider a robot which must outwit a motion detector. If it never stops and waits, it will never have a
chance to observe the little red light on the motion detector go out. This means it will never be able to corre-
late its motion in the environment with the behavior of the motion detector, since the detector will always be
detecting movement, and the light would always be on.
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Figure 21: Communication signature for both scenarios
Time flows downward in both diagrams. In both scenarios, the learning
system requests an action, has it performed in the microworld, and gets a set
of sensory bits returned. In the Hamsterdam case, an explicit null action is
also possible.
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By explicitly representing null actions, we allow changing the ratio of the number of
"real" actions performed to the number of "null" actions performed. Let us define this ratio
as follows:
A
0 A
where A is the number of "real" actions taken over some interval, OA is the number of
"null" actions taken over the same interval, and a is therefore a measure of behavior: if a
is substantially less than unity, the behavior of the system can be said to be shy or inhibited,
whereas if a is substantially greater than unity, the system's behavior can be said to be out-
going or audacious, to use some rather anthropomorphic terms. The parameter a thus
behaves vaguely like the level of limbic-system activation in the mammalian brain. When
the learning system is outgoing, taking action most of the time and never pausing to watch
the world go by, it can learn a great deal about the effects of individual actions it takes, but
not how the world functions if it were not taking actions at all. Conversely, when the learn-
ing system is shy, not taking action and instead observing how the state of the world
changes when it does nothing, it can learn how doing nothing affects the world.8
There is a secondary reason why null actions were introduced. The Hamsterdam micro-
world is continually updating its internal state, because its agents operate in real time, and
it must continue to update so as to re-render the scene and preserve the illusion of a
dynamic, changing world. Such updating happens several times a second, which is sub-
stantially faster than the learning system can keep up with the world on the current hard-
8. If the system were provided with a much more sophisticated source of data about the world, which cor-
responded to being told about the actions taken by other agents in the world, it would be possible for it to
learn the correlations between other agents' actions and their effects. However, no source of data like this
exists in the current scenarios studied; to make such a source available, the control structure of the learning
system would have to be modified to substitute other agents' actions for its own while computing statistics
and producing schemas. Presumably, the right time to make such a substitution would be when the agent is
otherwise performing a null action, or some action whose result is "overlearned" and hence whose results
are no longer interesting to the learning system.
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ware, even with the improvements described in later chapters. Were the learning system to
accept every update, it would be forced to discard many of them, or it would lag further and
further behind the current state of the world. Yet, the microworld cannot be expected to
know how fast the learning system can run. (Any such attempt would be doomed to failure,
given that the learning system's running speed varies dramatically based on what sort of
focus it employs and how much it already knows, and because both the learning system and
Hamsterdam are not tied to particular platforms.)9
Null actions provide an explicit solution to this dilemma. By allowing the learning sys-
tem to dictate exactly when it receives sensory input (it always gets one update after any
action, whether real or null, no more and no less), the learning system polls the microworld
for sensor updates. Therefore, the microworld's sensor update rate is throttled by the learn-
ing system. This is reasonable, since more-frequent updates would be useless to the learn-
ing system anyway. If the learning system is quite slow in requesting updates compared to
the speed at which the microworld runs, it will miss many important events and may in fact
not learn anything useful. Thus, any real agent employing this approach would have to be
placed in a situation where its cognitive speeds are up to the task of the world with which
it must interact, a familiar problem in both engineering and biology, or would at least
require the ability to be infrequently but quickly interrupted if some high-priority sensory
signal (such as being about to go over a cliff) demanded prompt attention.
9. The learning system can run under Symbolics Genera, at a variety of speeds depending upon the type of
Lisp Machine in use, or under Harlequin LispWorks, again at a variety of speeds depending on the type of
SGI used. Hamsterdam can run on many kinds of SGI platforms, each at a different speed.
136
System ArchitectureAppendix A
Appendix B: Implementation of Efficient Planning
B.1 Introduction
This appendix provides some details of how certain parts of the planning algorithms
were implemented. Perusal may help to clarify why certain things were done the way they
were, and give some insight into where difficulties remain.
These planning algorithms were designed to run essentially nonincrementally, e.g.,
they do not amortize their effort over the learning lifetime, but do all of it at the end. In a
real agent, of course, a system that incrementally built or modified the data structures
would be more appropriate.
Note that all of these algorithms were developed for use on a serial machine. Parallel
machines may be able to finesse some of these problems by doing their planning in a par-
allel fashion-at least as long as the problem does not grow larger than the number of
available processors, of course.
B.2 Reachability
The first requirement when attempting to plan a path from one schema to another is to
be assured that there is, in fact, such a route. Simple explorations of a digraph composed of
several thousand schemas will run exponentially slowly and are completely unsuitable;
other algorithms, such as the iterative deepening algorithm discussed in Section B.4, on
page 140, will fail to terminate if called to compute a path that does not, in fact, exist.
The general idea is to function like a depth-first, mark-sweep garbage collector. We
build a root set of all schemas with null contexts and non-null results. (Such schemas must
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be at the start of any chain, since, with null contexts, they cannot be chained to.) For each
root object, we traverse the set of all schemas with non-null contexts. If we find an
unmarked schema whose context chains from the result of the root object, we add it to the
chain being built, mark the schema we just found, and then use the new schema as the base
of a chain to be recursively extended. At any point during this process, we abandon the
attempt to extend the chain if we either cannot find a next schema to chain to, or if the next
schema is already marked (to prevent loops)-a marked schema must, by definition, have
already had its chain traversed, or to be in the process of having its chain traversed at the
moment. Since schemas are never duplicated and are therefore guaranteed unique
[Drescher 91], we cannot find that the first schema we find to extend the chain is already
marked, since the only way that two contextless schemas in the root set have the same next
schema in the chain is if their results are identical, and we just assumed that this cannot be.
Therefore, every schema in the root set that has any next schema will eventually wind up
pointing at such a next schema.
While extending the chain is depth-first, we also go breadth-first in finding other sche-
mas that might extend the chain from this schema for the case where this schema's result
might chain to more than one other schema at this level (e.g., if the current schema is
A/FOO/B, then valid next schemas are both B/BAR/C and B/BAZ/D, where there are two dif-
ferent actions leading from the same context to [same or different] results [C might or
might not equal D]).
When we extend a chain from schema A to schema B, we push B onto a list maintained
by A. At the end of this mark-sweep process, each schema contains a list of all other sche-
mas that can possibly be reached, by any path, from that schema. This constitutes the
reachability information. This is a relatively expensive operation; it can consume several
minutes on a fast Lisp processor. 1
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Note that the root set does not need to be regenerated when performing or recovering
from a lobotomy; this is explained further in Section B.3 below. This means that it may be
generated once for some particular set of schemas, and never regenerated unless schemas
are added to the knowledge base (schemas can never be subtracted).
The reachability results generated display interesting properties. In particular, there
exist "islands" of connections, such that any schema in an island is reachable (via some,
possibly quite convoluted and low-reliability) path from any other schema in the island.
(This is all the more interesting when one considers that schema chaining generates a
digraph, but islands of connections are generally connected in both directions.) As one
increases the number of schemas in the knowledge base, the initially large number of small
islands decreases, as the average size of each island increases. A knowledge base of 3000-
4000 schemas typically displays on the order of half a dozen such islands, which among
them completely partition the space.
B.3 Cached (lobotomized) reachable schemas
Given the above reachability information, we can relatively quickly compute a related
concept, namely those schemas reachable from some given schema when the knowledge
base has been lobotomized. For some schema still in the knowledge base, we can compute
this by doing a mark-sweep along the schema's precomputed reachable schemas, immedi-
ately abandoning any path which mentions a schema in a lobotomized section.
In practice, we do not do this exhaustively for every lobotomy; instead, we maintain a
hash table which caches lookups for any given schema. If some caller wishes the reachabil-
ity information for a schema, it retrieves the cached information if present; otherwise, it
computes it as described above and caches the result.
1. E.g., a Symbolics MacIvory Model 3.
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Obviously, this cache must be flushed if the reachability criteria (e.g., the extent of the
lobotomy) changes.
B.4 Computing paths from one arbitrary schema to another
The above cached reachability information now makes it possible to (relatively)
quickly compute possible paths between any pair of schemas. In general, the number of
possible paths between any given pair of schemas is quite large (perhaps millions in large
runs); it would be helpful if we could quickly find just one path that is very likely to be the
"best" we could do, especially since we must find such a path for every possible pair of
schemas (e.g., hundreds of millions or billions of possible paths if looking at the full cross
product).
Note that this is subtly different from the description of chaining (Section 4.3.2.4.1, on
page 74) and path metrics (Section 4.3.2.4.2, on page 75) in the description of planning in
Section 4.3.2.4. There, we were talking about picking a best path from amongst the thou-
sands of possible paths from pairs of schemas the INITIAL and FINAL sets. Here, we are
talking about picking a best path from amongst the millions of possible paths between
some arbitrary pair of schemas. To put it another way, in Section 4.3.1.1, we were given
(relatively) small sets of schemas-perhaps 50 to 100 schemas in each of INITIAL and
FINAL. We had to find one path from some schema in INITIAL to some schema in
FINAL; we were free to choose both ends of the path, plus the path itself, subject to the
constraints of which schemas were in which set and the dictates of the path metric. Here,
must find,for each possible pair of schemas in the entire knowledge base, some "best" path
connecting that pair.
Thus, the problem here is as follows. We must compute, for the full cross product of
every schema (call it A) to every other schema (call it B), what path to cache for the route
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from A to B. Several approaches to the problem of computing a path from A to B are
described below; any such approach would then have to be run several thousand or more
times to generate the complete set of paths (e.g., a 3600-schema path could conceivably
have 36002 or about 13 million paths; in practice, the graph is never that fully connected).
There are several approaches which are clear losers, as can be predicted from the Al
literature on search problems (see, e.g., [Norvig 92], to pick a nice example). Depth-first
search, for example, tends to favor long paths, which is a disaster in this system: the longer
the path, the lower its expected reliability. A typical search in a large run might lead to a
path several hundred actions long, when the "best" path (determined, say, by the algorithm
described in Case 4 in Section 4.3.2.4.2, on page 75) might be only one or two actions.
Using A* search is an attractive possibility. Unfortunately, it is far too slow. Because
we do not have a heuristic function available to guide the search, it takes far too long2 to
search the space, and conses enormous amounts intermediate garbage (in the form of path
data structures and lists of them) in the process.
It turns out that using iterative deepening is in fact a very efficient way to generate
short, useful paths in this case. This is where the cached reachability information becomes
critically important: if we are guaranteed that some path exists between two schemas, then
iterative deepening is guaranteed to find it. (And, in practice, the path found is generally
half a dozen actions or less.) However, if no such path exists, then iterative deepening will
run forever. Specifying an arbitrary upper limit on the length of a path may unnecessarily
deprive us of a good path that is, e.g, just one action past our limit, but using reachability
information, we may confidently set the upper limit at (effectively) infinity without worry-
ing about failing to terminate.
2. Minutes to an hour or more on the aforementioned processor.
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Using iterative deepening in this way, we stop computing the path between any given
pair of schemas when we find thefirst one. Because of the way in which iterative deepen-
ing works, this path is guaranteed to be as short or shorter than any other possible path (if
it were not, we would have found some different path at a shallower search depth). Rather
than enumerate all such possible paths of this length, we simply assume that the first one
we find is "good enough." In practice, this is perfectly reasonable behavior.
B.5 Computing a path between the INITIAL and FINAL sets
Given some combination of evaluation parameters as described in Section 4.3.2.9, on
page 84 (e.g., the knowledge base of schemas to be evaluated, the extent of any loboto-
mies, and the path metric in use), we can build a cache of known-best paths from any pair
of schemas (one in INITIAL, one in FINAL) that we have investigated. (This cache must
be flushed if the evaluation parameters change.)
This works as follows. To recap the discussion in Section 4.3.2.5.4, on page 81, in the
naive (e.g., no-cache) case, when planning a path to reach a goal, we must compute, for
each possible pair of schemas in INITIAL and FINAL, the path from the selected schema
(call it A) in INITIAL to the selected schema in FINAL (call it B). (The computation is per-
formed, as it was in Section B.4 above, in an iterative depth-first manner.) Once we have
computed all such paths, we then run the path metric on each such path, and pick the path
with the best merit.
The iterative depth-first computation of the path from A to B will never change, how-
ever, as long as the evaluation parameters remain constant. We can therefore cache this
work, so long as we are careful to flush the cache if these parameters change. Hence, the
revised algorithm, before computing the path from A to B using iterative deepening, instead
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checks the cache, and uses the cached path if it exists. Otherwise, it computes the path, and
caches it.3
Using the cache in this way vastly speeds up computation of candidate paths. When the
evaluation parameters are first changed (and the cache therefore flushed), the very first
attempt at path planning generates several thousand to several tens of thousands of cached
plans between different pairs of schemas. The next attempt at planning (after an action has
been taken) generates a much smaller number of new entries in the cache, since many sche-
mas that were in INITIAL and FINAL in the previous step may still be there (since only a
few sensory bits in the world are likely to change at any given step). Empirically, the cache
tends to grow asymptotically to about 5% of the total number of possible cross-products
from all schemas to all other schemas, and does so in a small number (10 to 20) of actions
executed. This is true because many schemas never wind up in INITIAL or FINAL in any
given evaluation.
Hence, by caching the results of path lookup, we eliminate redundant calls to the itera-
tive deepening algorithm. By computing the path between any given pair of schemas only
on demand, instead of computing the entire cross-product, we decrease the required size of
the cache and the effort of computing all those paths by a factor of 20 or so.
B.6 The promise of randomized algorithms
Despite the care with which the algorithms described above attempt to avoid combina-
torial explosion and minimize redundant computation, they are still just barely in the
bounds of reasonability for runs of several thousand schemas. On current hardware, gener-
ating the complete set of cached reachable schemas for a run of 3000-4000 schemas takes
3. The cache is implemented as a simple hash table, keyed by a number unique to each possible ordered
pair of schema numbers. (For example, if x and y are the two schema numbers, a possible hash key could be
xn+y, so long as n>y.) Keying by a number eliminates consing and allows use of an EQL hash table, which is
extremely quick.\
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most of an hour. Generating the majority of the cached INITIAL/FINAL paths for a run of
that size can easily take another hour or more. Once several possible goals have been run
in the same evaluation cycle, the results of the caching start to pay off, but planning is still
somewhat slow, averaging a few seconds to half a minute or more (depending on the nov-
elty of the situation, e.g, how many initial/final pairs were already cached) per plan gener-
ated.
It seems clear that, short of parallel implementation (which can at least pull one degree
out of a polynomial blowup, at least until one runs out of processors), a better solution may
to make use of randomized algorithms such as so-called Monte Carlo algorithms. This was
not investigated in this research, but the significant speedups that randomized algorithms
can offer in quickly finding a close-to-optimal path is probably well worth the small prob-
ability of not finding the truly optimal path. Given the somewhat ad-hoc nature of both the
existing path metrics and the random nature of exactly which schemas have been created at
any point in time, it is unlikely that a well-written randomized algorithm would noticeably
degrade accuracy in path formation, and is likely to be orders of magnitude faster. This is
an area deserving of future research.
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